University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

11-20-1945

Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles 27 Cal.2d 232 (1945).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/196

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

232

GOSPEL ARMY V. CITY OF

Los

ANGELES

[27 C.2d

[L. A. No. 18808. In Bank. Nov. 20, 1945.)

'THE GOSPEL ARMY (a Corporation), Respondent, v.
CITY OF LOS
., ANGELES et al., Appellants.
[1] Secondhand Merchandise-brdinance.-A city ordinance requiring junk and seconill2and dealers to procure permits, to file
reports of goods bought or t&eeived, describing the goods and
the seller, and to retain the go'ods for from 3 to 21 days before
disposing thereof. is reasonable. ' ..
[2] Religious Societies-Municipal Regillations.-A city ordinance
regulating junk and secondhand dealers is applicable to a
religious organization which procures donations of money and
articles of value in prosecution of its religious work.
[8] Charities-Municipal control-Soliciting.-Los Angeles Mu~
nicipal Code. ~§ 44.01-44.19, requiring permits to solicit funds
for charity. is not undnly burdemmme or unreasonable.
[4] Religious Societies-Municipal B.egulations-Soliciting.-An
ordinance regulating the solicitation of charitable contributions applies to a religious organization soliciting funds for
charitable purposes as part of its relilcious duties, and is Dot
on that account obje<ltionable as abridgine: its religious liberty.
[5a,5b] Id.-Municipal B.egulatioD&--8oliciting.-The requirement
of an ordinance regulating solicitation of charitable contributions that promoters and solicitors submit proof of their good
character and reputation is not subject to the objections that
it discriminates against religious organizations. censors their
religious beliefs. or vests arbitrary power in t!te board administering it to withhold " lieense if not sati!:f\ed that the applicant is of good character and reputation. Nor is a provision
for revocation of II license for unfair practices' of solicitation
objectionable a!' affording- an opportunity for censorship of
religoious beliefI'.
[1] Regulation of junk dealers, see notes, SO A.L.R. 1427; 88
A.L.R.970. See. III so. 7 Cal.,Tur. 10-Yr. Supp. 366; 33 Am.,Tm. 336;
47 Am.,Tur. 555.
[4) Regulating solicitatiun of alms and charitable contributions,
see notes. 57 A.L.R. 516: 128 A.L.R. 1361.
(5) Ordinances vesting discretion in officials, see notes, 12 A.L.R.
1435; 54 A.L.R. 1104.92 A.L.R. 400. See. also. 16 Cal..Tur. 230. 33
Am.,Tur. 377.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Secondhand Merchandise; [2. 4. 5]
Religious Societies, § 12; [3] Charities, § 38; [6] Licenses, 136.
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[6] Licenses-Amou..'lt.-A license fee ~overiDg the expenMS of investil!'lltionl" Ilno aominh;tratio...f iR res!;onahle.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles Count.y. Haroli! R .Tpffery .•Tlld~~ Reversed.
Action to enjoin 6l1forcement of ordinances regulating
transactions in secondhand goods and solicitations for charitable purposes. .Tudgment for plalnt.lff reversed .

.

Ray L. Chesebro, Cit;\7 Attorney. Frederick von Schrader,
Assistant City Attorney, and Wilbur Bassett, Deputy City
Attorney, for Appellants.
Robert H. Wallis for Respondent.

./

)

TRA YNOR, J.-Certain ordinances of the City of Los Angeles regulate transact.ions in Recondhand goods and solicitations for charitable purposes. Plaintiff. an incorporated
religious organization. hrom!ht this snit to enjoin the enforcement of these ordimmces as applied to it on the ground they
abridged its religion!' liberty in violation of the Constitution
of the United States and t.he r.onsthl1tion of Clllifornia. The
trial court found t.hllt nllllntiff i~ "em!II!.!p.d ex('ll1!;lvelv in the
promulgation. by litprllture lind word of mOllth. of if.R religious beliefs. by lind t.hr011<rh its 1I1lXilillrles. IIni! in the procuring of donlltions in the form of monev an(l article!' of value
in the prO!~ecl1tion ani! furthpl'lInce of 'its relilrious activities."
It enjoined defendants from "further interieren('e and threatened acts. which WOl1J(1 in IInv way prevent the free exercise
of the religio1l!' Iiherty Ani! freedom of worship of the said
Plaintiff." Defendants appeal.
The findin/? of the trilll court must be viewed in the light
of the evidence. which is nndi!:lputed. Religious services at
plaintiff's miRSion Rre condu('ted by a minister ordained by it
whose compensation depenil!' entirely on solicited contn1>l1tions. Plaintiff enga~e!'l ;n missionary work. di!!tributes the
New Testament a.nd religiolls t.racts free to the public. and
gives assistance to those in need. It collectA salvage from the
pub1i(' to obtain fllni!~ to Tlronalrnte ;tA religious dOctrines and
to provide aiil to the poor. Some of the 88lvage ill sold in a
secondhand good~ ~or(> nnerllted hy plaintiff; !lome. such as
clothing, is distributed to the poor; goods not suitable for
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furthl'r nse go directly to a salvage mill. The salvage is
eo11eeted b~· plaintiff's "indllf1triIl1 soliritors" in four of plaintiff's trnrks. 1'hl' money rrceiv('(l from the sale of seeonclhand
goods in plaintiff's 8to;e is TIseo to meet the cost of operllting
thr !o1tore. inr1noing,thl' romncms/ltion paio to the mana<.!er and
t111' ~o1i('itors. \Vhatf'ver remllin!' is paii! into plaintiff's treasnl'~·. ~inet~· per eent of t.lft. money re('Pivei! for thl' mill
m:l1eria1 gops to thp orh·pl'R of thl' trll{'ks: thl' rrmllindpr is
tnrnl'o oyer to t11P mllnlH!PT of thl' store for plllir.tiff's treasury.
Othl'r employees of plaintiff 'lolirit mone~' from the public.
Solicitors make the obie('t of thpir mission known by showing
to prospertive donors a printed card ~tating that "the bearer
whosl' ~ignature is herein attached for identifieation is duly
authorizeo to solieit monev, food. clothing or anv other useful
articles that will hf'ln th~ /1ospel Arm:r ·to carry' on their rereligious home missionary ani! evangelical work among the
poor and under-privileged." Abont fifty per cent of the fund!!
raised is absorbed by the cost of soliciting, including the compensation of the solieitors, which is paid on a percentage
basis. The funds remaininQ' are nsed t.o pay the eost of furnishing tracts and rp1igiom: literature free to the publie and
to Rupply food. lodcin/!. ('lothing and car fare to the poor.
[1] Section 24.01 of the T.JOs Angeles Municipal Code defines a "junk dealer" as "a person having a fixed placf' of
business in this City who /!oes from house to house or from
place to place. !?Ilthering. eol1f'cting. buying, selling or otherwise dealin/! in any 010 rll~. sacks. bottles. cans, paper, metal
or other artie.]es commonl~' known a!: junk." A "secondhand
dealer" is "a person p.ngaging in. conducting, manlll!1ng-. or
carrying on thf' busint:'ss of buying. selling or otherwise dealing in secondhand goods. ware!: or merchandise." Junk dealers
and secondhand dealf'r!' mnst obtain a permit to engage in
busines!': from defendant eitv's Hoard of Police Commis.<;ioners.
The following "Requisitf's 'of Permits" are set forth in subsection (a) of Seetion 24.01; .. (]) Persons de."Iiring to obtain
a permit to conduct, manage or deal in any busines." mentioned in subsection 'a' (If thi!: Section shall file an application
in writin/! with tht:' Hoaro ~pecifyin/! by ~treet and number
the place where sneh hmlines!': is proposed to be condueted or
carried on: junk oollpl'tors havin/! no fixed place of busine.'lS
!lhall Rpecify in such application their re.'lidence by lrtreet
number. The application shall be mgned by the applieant and
shall contain his residence address.. (2) Before receiving an

)
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application for any permit the Board shall require the payment of such fees as are hereafter specified. (3) Upon receipt
of such application the B6ard shall cause to be investigated
the business of the applicant and 10catioIl at which applicant
proposes to engage in b~sin('ss as specified in said application.
Thereafter the Board may issue ~,,:.permit to the applicant
which shall be effeethe for the remaining p(}rtion of the current year. (4) Persons operating unner the provisions of
this Section shall be required to secure an annual renewal
of such permit commencing 'January 1st of the succecding
year in which such permit was granted. (5) ~o person holding
a permit to conduct. manage, earry on or deal in any business
mentioned in subseetion 'a' of this Section shan buy, sen or
otherwise deal in secondhand jewelry, precious stones, precious metals (including old gold), watches or other similar
secondhand merchandise without first applying for and, reo
ceiving a special permit therefor from the Board in the manner provided in this Section for securing ordinary permits."
The fees prescribed are set forth in subsection (d):" (1) Applications for permits other than. provided for in this subsection shall pay the sum provided in Section 22.10; (2)
Applications for special permits. the sum of $50.00: (3) Applications for annual permit renewal, the sum of $25.00: (4)
Applications for changing location of place of business for
which a permit has been granted, the sum of $10.00; (5)
Change of ownership, the sum of $10.00, to be applicable
only in eases where the new owner is already operating under
a permit issued pursuant to provisions of this Section." Subsection (e) provides: "( 1) The Board shall not grant any
permit provided for in this Section to persons who fail, refuse
or neglect to comply with the laws and ordinances relating
to and regulating the business for which such permit is sought.
(2) Persons applying for or obtaining permits under the
provisions of this Section shall comply with the provisions
of this Section." Subsection (f) provides for the revocation
of permits: "Any permit issued under the provisions. of this
Section may be revoked or suspended upon the grounds provided for in this Section: (1) ... If persons holding permits
under the provisions of this Section shall violate any of the
provisions of this Section or any provisions of any other ordinance, or any law relating to or regulating any such busil1ess,
01' shall CQnduct 01' carryon such business in an unlawful

• i
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manner, the Board. in addition to 'any other penalties provided by this Code. <;hall l'evob::.."uch permit iRsued to such
person; (2) . . . Permits granted pursuant to this Section
shall be revoked only in the manner provided in Section 22.02
of this Code; (3). . No permit shall be'~ranted to any person to ('onduct. man~e, carryon or deal in any business
mentioned in subsection 'a' of this Section whose permit has
been revoked by the Board until six (6) months have elapsed
after such revocation" HolderR of permits must keep a complete record of all goods purchased or received by them, which
is open to inspection by any member of the police department.
They must also file with the Chief of Police daily reports on
prescribed forms of the goods purchased or received during
the preceding day, describing the article and specifying the
hour of the day when it was acquired, the name and address
of the party from whom it was acquired, the height, age, sex,
complexion, and other characteristics of that person. The
hours of business are prescribed. Secondhand dealers must
keep the articles received by them 21 days before selling them.
The period prescribed for junk dealers is three days. With
respect tG certain articles classed as scrap, junk dealers are
exempted from the provisions requiring the keeping of records, the filing of reports. and the keeping of articles for three
days. There are comparable exemptions for secondhand
dealers. If a claim is made that property in the hands of the
holder of a permit is stolen, the board, in the event no court
action is pending, may determine whether or not the property
was stolen from the claimant and order its return if it was.
If such an order is disobeyed. the board may revoke the permit. The foregoing provisions are reasonable, and the standards prescribed are adequate. (In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640,
646 [203 P. 398] ; Oo-operative Junk 00. v. Board of Police
Oommissioners, 38 Cal.App. 676. 679 [177 P. 308]; Zemanskll
v. Board of Police Oommissioners, 61 Cal.App.2d 450, 453-455
[143 P.2d 361]; see 30 A.L.R. 1427; 88 A.L.R. 970, 972;
7 Cal.Jur. 10-yr. Supp. 366; 33 Am.Jur. 336-339, 355; 47
Am.Jur. 555.)
[2] Regulation of the business of junk dealers and secondhand dealers is designed to protect the public interest by preventing such dealers from becoming outlets for stolen goods.
No question arises as to the constitutionality of such regulation when the business regulated is not carried on by a religious organization. (Lewis v. Quinn, 217 Cal. 410, 413 [19

I
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P.2d 236]; In re Holmes, supra; Oo-operative Junk Co. v.
Board of Police Oommissioners. supra; Zemansky v. Board of
Police Commissioner's, supra; see 3{) A.L.R. 1427; 88 A.L.R.
970, 972; 7 Cal.Jur. 10-yr. Supp.)66; 33 Am.Jur. 336-339, 355 :
47 Am.Jur. 554.) Business carried on by a religious organiza·
tion cannot be differentiated, for the reasons set forth below
with respect to the validity of t.he relN,lation of plaintiff's
'.
solicitation of funds foreharity.
[3] Sections 44.0}. to 44.19 of the Los Angeles Municipal
Code regulate solicitations of funds for charity. The term
"charitable" includes "Philanthropic, social service, benevolent, patriotic, either actual 0 4 purported." The term "contribution" includes "alms, fooa, clothing, money, property
or donations under the guise of a loan of money or property."
(§ 44.01.) Certain provisions, applicable to solicitors of
charitable contributions in general, are designed primarily to
secure information that will assist the public in judging the
nature and worthiness of the cause for which the solicitation
is made and to insure the presentation of such information.
to prospective donors. We find nothing unduly burdensome
or unreasonable in any of these provisions. Section 44.05,
which is quoted in the margin,· requires any person who
solicits for any charitable purpose to rue with the Department
.''N0 person shall solicit,. nor shall an1. officers or member of any
association authorize any person to solhllt, any contribution for any
charitable purpose unless, within the fiscal year of the City in which such
solicitation is made and at least within ten (10) days prior to the be·
ginning of such solicitation, there shall have been 1I1ed with the Department, on a form furnished by said Department, by such person or association upon whose behalf the solicitation is made, written Notice of
Intention to solicit I!1lch contribution, which notice shall contain complete
information as follows:
"(a) The purpose of the solicitation and UN of the contribution to
be solicited j
"(b) A specific statement, supported bl reasons and, if available,
Agures, showing the need for the contribution proposed to be solicited;
.. (c) The character of such solicitation and how it will be made or
~nducted;

)

"(d) The expenses of the solicitation, including salaries and other
items, if any, regardless of from what funds such expenses are payable;
.. (e) What portion of the contributions collected as a result of the
IOlicitation will remain available for application to the speei1ic purposes
declared in the Notice of Intention as the object of the IOlicitation;
"(f) A specific statement of all contributions collected or received
by l!1leh person or aasociation within the ealendar year immediately
preceding the filing of such Notice of Intention. The expenditure or use
made of I!1lch contributions, together with the names and addresses of
all persons or associations receiving salaries, wages, eompeu.aat.i.cm, eoa-
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of Social Service a noticE' of intention to solicit ten days before
the solicitation. This notice must contain, among other things,
information regarding the purpose, character, method, and
estimated expenses of the solicitation, the need for the contribution to be solicited, the proposed use of the solicited
funds. the amount that will re'inain available for charitable
purposes over expenses. thc ,mount received from solicitations
in the preceding calendar year, the expenses of such solicitations, and the amount that remained available for charitable
purposes. The department may int8Stigate the statements
in the notice of intention. (§ 44.03(a).) Information cards
setting forth the facts in the notice of intention and such other
facts as in the opinion of the Board of Social Service Commissioners will be of assistance to the public in determining
the nature and worthiness of the solicitation (Section 44.06
quoted in the rnargint) are issued by the Department of Social
Service!: for four cents per card. (§ 44.03 (e).) The infor.

)

)

missions or emoluments from such contributions, and the respective
amounts thereof;
"(g) The names and addresse~ of the officers and directors of any
such association fOT which the solicitation is proposed to be made;
"(h) A copy of the resolutlOn, if any, of any such association authorizing such solicitation, certified to as a true and correct copy of the
original of such resolution by the offi('.er of such association having :
charge of the records thereof;
"(i) A statement that the sib'1lerS of such Notice have read and are
familiar with the provisions of this Article and will require all IOlicitors
engaged in such solicitation to read and be familiar with all eections
of this Article prior to making any such solicitation."
t"There shall be filed with the Department with such Notice of intention a statement of any agreement made with any agent, IOlicitor,
promoter, manager or conductor of such solicitation, together with a
copv of each agreement which may be in writing. Within twenty-four
bours after any change in any such agreement or the making of any
new or further agreement, a true copy of such change or agreement,
if in writing, or if not, written details thereof shall be filed with the
Department. Whenever, in the opinion of the Board, the Notice of intention filed with the Department does not disclose sufficient information
for the public concerning the facts hereinabove required to be stated in
Buch Notice or concerning the person or association making such IOlicitation or on whose behalf such solicitation is made, then, upon the request
of said Department, there shall be filed, in writing, within forty-eight
(48) hours after such request, such additional information as may be
required by said Board upon the foregoing subjects. Provided, however, that the Board, for good cause, may extend the time for filing such
additional information. The Notice of Intention and such additional
information, if requested, shall be ~igned by such person intending to\
make such solicitation, or if by or on nny association, by at least two
officers of such associatwn and ahall be open to the inspection of the
public."
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mation cards, which are in effeet permits to solicit, are issued
automatically upon the filing of the required information and
the payment of the four cents for each card. The department is
given no authority to wit.hhold such cards when these requirements are met, and we cannot assume that it will abuse its
authority in order to wit.hhold them. As this court said in
Tn rc Holmes, 187 C~l. 640. 64''7 [203 P. 3981, quoting from
In rc F'lahertu, 105 Cal. 55i; 562 [38 P. 981, 27 L.R.A. 5291
and Gaylord v. Citll of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 43!=!, 437 Pfi6 P.
3481: "'Laws are not made li~on the theory of the total depravi1y of those who are ejected to 118.minister them; ana t.h<presumption is that municipal officers
not use these small
powers villianously or for purposes of oppression or misehief.'
If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the requirement of the section of the charter above quoted, and been
either whimsically or arbitrarily refused such permit, he
mi~ht then. as is shown in Gaylord v. Oity of Pasadena, S1(pra.
have had recourse to the courts for relief from such unjust
and arbitrary action."
Each solicitor must exhibit an information card to the prospectiye donor and must not make any misstatements. A solicitor must also carry written authorization from the assol?intion that he represents. The board may recall the cardR awl
amend them if it receives additional information showing that
any statements thereon are incorrect. The board may not disallow a proposed solicitation but it may investigate the
statements in the notice of intention and the methods of making or conducting the solicitation; it may inspect the records
of the person in charge of the solicitation and the association
for whom it is made, and it may give such publicity to its
findings as it deems best to reach the general public and persons interested. Th~ association for whom the solicitation is
made must maintain an accounting system recording the entry
of all donations and disbursements. (§ 44.08.)
More restrictive provisions are applicable to promoters. A
promoter is "any person who for pecuniary compensation or
consideration received, or to be received, solicits or is engaged
in the business of or holds himself out to the public as engaged
in the business of soliciting contributions for or on behalf of
any other person or any charitable association, corporation or
institution, or conducts, manages or carries on ... any drive
or campaign for any such purpose; provided, however, that

will
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pecuniary compensation or consideration as used herein, shall
include, but shall not be limited to, participation on a percentage basis in any fund ;solicited, or raised, for or on behalf
of any other person, firm, association or corporation; provided, further, that no person who is a bona fide paid officer
or employee of a social service agency endorsed by the Board
of Social Service Commjssioners, shall be considered a promoter within the meaning of ~is article." (§ 44.01.) The
conditions that a social agency must meet to be endorsed by
the Social Service Commission an4, the standards that govern
the commission are set forth in a separate ordinance, the relevant part of which is quoted in the margin.· In our opinion
·"Sec. 2. Said Commission shall have power:
"I. To investigate, when requested or permitted, by the officers or
persons in charge thereof all charitable or philanthropic corporations or
associations dependent upon public appeal or general lIolicitations for
support, and submit quarterly, in writing. the result of such investigation to the Council.
"2. To endorse such of said charitable corporations or associations
as shall apply to said Commission for endorsement and prove to the Commission that they have complied with the following provisions, namely:
"(a) That the title to any real property in the City of Los Angeles
owned by such charitable corporation or association ill vested in the
name of said charity, if it be a corporation, or ebe in the name or
names of a responsible trustee, or trustees onder a declaration of trust
or other written instrument, setting forth the rights of such charitable
corporation or association therein, and recorded in th(' records of the
County Recorder of Los Angeletl County.
"(b) That the declared purpose for whiCh such a corporation or association is organized are charitable or philanthropic, and not for the
pecuniary profit of thp members or associates thereof or any of them.
"(c) That for three months prior to its endorsement said charitable
corporation or association has faithfully complied with the following
provision~ with reference to its accounts, namely: All funds received
by it and all disbursements made by it, have been entered upon the books
of its treasurer or other financial officer, receipts have been given 01'
tendered for all money or other property donated to it, whenever reo
quired by law or ordinance all expenditures other than petty cash to a
reasonable amount have been made by checks signed by at least two
officers of such corporation or association; that the bank book of such
asosciation or corporation has been balanced and reconciled with the
books of account at reasonable intervals.
"(d) That no moneys of lI3.id corporation or association are on Ioan
directly or indirectly to any officer, director, trustee or employee thereof,
and that the corporation or association for a period of three monthll
prior to its enoorsement bas not invested any moneys constituting part
of itll permanent endowment funds exeept in lIecurities legal as investments for savings banks within the State of California, and has not
paid out more than 15% of any amounts collected by solicitation within
the City of Los Angeles for expenses of 1I0licitation, and has not diverted
funds donat.ed to it from any iOurce to purpOl!etl other than thotle for
which they were donated.
"'Prooric1ed, boWfter, that the proviaiou of Uda paragraplllball . .

)
/
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the classification effected bv this ordinance is reasonable and
the standards provided ar~ adequate.
A promoter must apply fOJ! a promoter's license. The application must set forth )he applicant's qualifications and
show that he is of good character and reputation. Persons
working as solicitors for 'compensation under the promoter
must be registered as soticitors. The ...board grants a promoter's
license if it is satisfied that the applieant is of good character
and reputation, is equal to the financial responsibility incident
to the proposed solicitation and ~intends to conduct his business as promoter fairly and honestly. Similarly, before registering a soliritor, the board must be satisfied of his good
character and reputation. A license fee of $25 is required for
a promoter's license. A promoter must also file a $2,000 bond
with the board to insure contributors against loSR through
theft. Solicitors must file a $!'>OO bond and pay a registration
fee of $1.00. The board may revoke a promoter's license, after
a hearing. for any "unfair. llnjust. inequitable or fraudu-

/

apply to anr loan or investment that hils been made prior to the passagE'
of this ordmancE'.
"(e) That the work for whlch su<!h corporation or 8.l!Sociation bas
been organized bas been faithfully performed.
"(f) That the by·laws and other written rules and regulations of
such corporation or association define the powers and duties of the officers of such corporation or association, and that a copy of the ArticleI',
of Incorporatiton of said charity, if it be a corporation, and a copy of
the By·Laws and other written rules and regulations of such corporation
or association have been filed With the Social Service Commission.
"(g) That within three months prior to its endorsement such 8
corporation 0'1' M~o~iRtkn hn!l not violated anv \a'l'\" or ordinance applicable to it.
.
"(b) Tbat the officers and employees of such corporation or association are persons of good moral character and reputation and that the
corporation or association has exerciRed reasonable care in selecting
persons of goorl mOl'1t1 I'hnroptpT AT'iI PPRlIonnhlp E':q>eTienrp R~ "o1icitor~
for its funds.
"Said Commission sllall ISSUp said endorsement to any such corpora·
tion or association as shall comply with the aforesaid requirements. Said
endorsement shall be valid for such time as shall be fixed by the Commission but not exceeding one yeAr from date of its issuance.
"Said Commil.sion shall report to the Couneil upon request by it the
name of any corporation or association which is endorsed or has been
refused endorsement by it. with R la'enerR I "tRtement of the reasons for
its refusal.
"Said Commission shall also have power to request any endorsed
corporation or usociation to make application for a new endorsement
at or after the end of each fiscal year or at an earlier period if the
Commission shall deem such requirement advisable, and if _id corporation or 8.l!Sociation IIhall not 80 do its endorsemeDt Iha1I be withdrawn."

242
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lent" act of a promoter or his employees, or agents in making
a solicitation or conducting tll~ husiness of promoter. Any
ground that would have led to' denial of the license is a11l0
ground for its revocation. .,
Solicitations upon premises owned or occupied by the association upon wIlOse hrIm If the 1Iolir.iSation is mnde, ani! the
soliciting of funds solel~' Trom members of the soli('iting association arc not suhject to tlJ{' provisions concerning promoters
and !ololicitors or to certain other' "eglllator~' provisions of the
ordinance. "Solicitations made solely for eYan!!e1i('a 1 mi1lsionan' or religious purposes" are also exempted. If. however,
they are conducted in such a manner as in the' opinion of the
hoard may give the persons solicited or the publi(' the impresliion t11llt the purpose of the solicitation is in whole or in part
charitable. the board may investigat.e the matter and give
su('h publicity to it.s finding'!! liS it may deem hest to advisE' the
pnhli(' of the facts. (~44.16.)
[4J Plaintiff contends t.hat since the practice of charity
IInr] the solicitation of funds for that purpose are part of its
religions duties, the ordinances regulating the so1i('.itation of
('haritll hIe contributions cannot apply to plaintiff's solicitations without abridging its religious liberty in violation of
the Constit.ution of t.he Unit.ed State1l lIud the Constitution of
f'[11ifornia.
ReliQ"iOl1s liberty "embraces two concepts,-freedom to belirw nnd freedom to act. The first is absolutE' but. in the
natm'C' f)f things. the second cannot be." (Cantwell v. Sfate of
f:onnertiCllt. 310 U.S 296. 303 r60 S.Ct. 900. 84 TJ.Ed. 1213.
12>< A.L.R. 13!121.) The eonstitutional guarantee protects the
:lrl)fession of II religious belief by word of mouth or in writing. t1IP dissemination of the doctrines of a religious organization b~' preaching from the pulpits or other method~ of
evan (.!p.Ji!lm, or the right to refuse to state beliefs against the
riictate" of one'~ e.onsciene.e. (M1lrdock v. Pennsylvania. 319
n.R ]05. 109 [63 S.Ot. 870. R9I. 87 L.Ed. 1292. 146 A.L.R.
811: West Virginia v. Barnette. 319 U.s. 624. 642 [63 ~tCt.
1178.87 L.Ei!. 1628.147 A.L.R. 6741.) "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official.
high or pet.ty. can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nat.ionalism. religion. or other matters of opinion. or force
citizens to confess by word of mouth or act their faith therein." (West Virgini" v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624. 642 f63 S.Ot.
1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674].) It does not follow,
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however, that religious organizations cnjoy unlimited frccdom
in carrying on a]] activities refitted to their rcligious program.
As the TTnitC'n States SnpN'lne Court d('(~lared in 'Murdor.k v.
PcnnsJ/7va?1?·I1. 3HITTiS. 105, 109-110 r63 S.Ct. 870. 8!lJ. 87
L.En. 1292. 14(1 .-}.L.R. R]l: "we do not intimate or suggest
.. that an~' condllC't can he madE' ll~rrli~ioll~ rite Ilnd b~' the
zeal of the practitioners swept into' t111' First Amendment.
Reynolds v. TTnite.d Rta.tes.'.Q,8 U.R. 14!'i. 161-Hi7. 2!) L.Bi!. 244.
and Da.vis '\". Beason. 133 n.S. 333. 10 S.Ot. 2!)!l. ~m L.Ri!. fl37.
denied any such claim to the pr8eticE' of poh'l!am~' ana bigamy.
Other claims may well arise whirh deser'Ve the same fate. We
only hold that spreading one's religiOlls hrlief!': or prearhing
the Gospel through distribution of rE'li'!ious litE'ratnre and
through personal visitations is an a~e-old t~"Pe of evangelism
with as high a claim to constitutional protE'rtion as the more
orthodox types."
Man;\' activities prompted by religious motives can hardly
be diffE'rentiated from secular acth·ities. If the applicability
of government reg'ulation turned on the religions motivation
of activities. plausible motivations would multiply and in the
end vitiate any regulation. "~iYil 1ihC'rtie.~. as guaranteE'd by
the Constitution. imply the existenre of an organized society
maintaining public orner without whir11 liherty it!Oelf would
be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.... Where II restriction of the use of hi!!hways ... il': nE'!';igned to promote
the publi(' <.'onvenien('e in the interest of all. it cannot be disregardeo h~- the IIttempteo exercise of !';ome civil ril:!ht which
in other circumstances wouln be entitled to protection. One
would not be .iustified in ignoring the familiar red traffic
light because he thought it his religious dut;\' to disobey the
m-uni('ipal commano or ~oul!ht h, that means to direct 'Ptlblic
attention to an announcement of his opinions." (Cox v. New
Hampshire. ::112 TTK !'if)9. !)74 r~l S.Ct. 762. 8!) L.Ed. 1049.
J33 A.L.R 139f)1 , Tn Pri'nce v. ~[nssachuse.tts, 321 U.~. 158
r64 8.et. 43fl. 8R L.Rn. fi451. it was contended that religious
liberty was abridged bv the application of a statute regulating
child labor to II ~lIl'oilln who permitted her minor ward to
distribute religious liternture on the streets at night. Tn vindicating t.he state's power to regulate in this way thE' dis.~emi·
nation of religiou!': heliefs. the court declared: "The parent.'s
conflict with the stllt.e ow'r control of the child and his training is serious enough when only secular matters are concerned.
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It becomes the more so when an element of religious eonvict.ion enters. Against these 811~rei! private interests, basic in a
democ1'n<'? stani! th(' int('rest~ of 80ciet:' to protect the wel·
fare of ('hildren and th(' state's ass(,1'tion of fluthority to that
end. made here in a manner ~oncede<l valii! if only seeu1ar
thin/'"s \\'er(' involved The last 'ls no mere ~orporate concern
of officia 1 aut horit". ft is'the ltlterest of youth it.o;elf. and of
t.he whole ('ommnl1·itv. that children be both safeguarded from
ahuses and given ~pportunities for growing into free and
independent well-developed men and ('ith~ens. Between contrary pulls of such weight. the' ~afest ani! most objective recourse is to the lines nlrendy marked out. not precisely but
for guides. in narrowing the no man's land where this battle
has gone on
the family itself is not be~'ond regulation in
the pUblic interest. AS against a claim of religious liberty.
Reynolds v. United S:f"te.~. 98 n.R 145. 2!'i T.J.Ei!. 244: Davis v.
Beason. 133 U.S. 333. 10 S.Ct. 2!HI. 33 L.Ed. 637. And neith(!r
right'! of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitntion. Acting to guard the general interests in youth's well
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent'"
control by requiring school attendance. regulating or prohibiting the chiJd's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent ~rounds his
claim to control the child's eourse of conduct on religion or
conscience .... It iR sufficient to show what indeed appellant
hardl~' disputes. that the state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authorit~· in thin~ affecting
the child's welfare: and that this includes. to some extent,
matters of conscienee ani! religious conviction."
Activities characteristie of t.he secular life of the community may properly be a concern of the community even
though they are carried on by a religious organization. (See
Prince v. Massac71usetts. 321 n.s. ]58. 165 [64 S.Ct. 438. 88
L.Ed. 645] : United States f'. Ballard. 322 U.S. 78. 87 [64 S.Ct.
882, 88 L.Ed. 11481: Murdock v. Pennsylt.ania. 319 U.S. 105.
109 [63 S.Ct. 870. 1391. 87 L.Ed. 1292. 146 A.L.R. 811 : rha.plinsky v. New Hampshire. 315 n.s. 568. 571 [62 S.Ot. 766. 86
L.Ed. 10311: Cox v. 'New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569, 574 161 ,
S.Ct. 762. 85 L.Ed. 1049. 133 A.L.R. 13961: Dat.is v. Reason. .
133 U.S. 333. 342 rIO S.Ct. 299. 33 L.Ed. 6371 : Tn re Dart.
172 Cal. 47.56 [155 P. 63. Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127. L.R.A. 1916D
905] : Chrisman v. Culinary Workers' etc .. 46 CaJ.App.2d 129,
132 [115 P.2d 553] ; People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 [68 N.E.
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243, 98 Am.St.Rep. 666, 63 L.R.A. 187] ; Oity of St. Louis v.
H ellscher, 295 Mo. 293 [~42 S.W. 652]; Commonwealth v.
('hilds, 299 ~iass. 367 [12 :-':.E.2d 814] ; Oommonwealth v.
Ureen, 268 Mass. 585 [168 N.E. 101J ; Oommonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375 [19 N.E. 224, 12 }\m.St.Rep. 566, 2 L.R.A.
142] ; State v. Wl}.ite, 64 N.H. 48 [5 A. 828]; Stull v. Reber,
215 Pa. 156 [64 A. 419, 7 Ann.Cas. 415) ; Matter of Frazee,
63 Mich. 396, 405 [30 N.W. 72, 6 Am.St.Rep. 3101; State v.
Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 99... [71 N.E. 197]; see, also. 7.o11man,
Religious Moerty in the American Law, 17 Mich.L.Rev. ::l55,
456.) Religious organizations engage in various activities stl('h
as founding colonies, operating libraries, schools, wineries,
hospitals, farms. industrial and other commercial enterprises.
Conceivably they may engage in virtually any worldly activity, but it does not follow that they may do so as specially
privileged groups, free of the regulations that others must
observe. If they were given such freedom, the direct consequence of their activities would be a diminution of the state's
power to protect the public health and safety and the general welfare. With that power so easily diminished there
would soon cease to be that separation of church and state
underlying the constitutional concept of religious liberty. (See
Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54 [222 P.
801, 31 A.L.R. 1121] ; Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691
[166 N.W. 202, 5 A.L.R. 841] ; People ex rel. Ring v. Board of
Education, 245 TIL 334 [92 N.E. 251, 19 Ann.Cas. 220, 29
L.R.A.N.S. 442]; Board of Education of Cincinnati v.
Minor,23 Ohio St. 211 [13 Am.St.Rep. 233] ; Donn-hoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 [61 Am.Dec. 256].)
There is no doubt that plaintiff, like many religious organizations, regards the practice of charity as a religious duty.
It is Dot exclusively a religious activity, however; many charitable activities spring from sources in the everyday life of the
community unrelated to religion. The state itself has an
active responsibility for the welfare of the poor, the aged, the
sick, the unemployed, and thc orphaned. There is a public
interest in regulating the solicitation of funds for these purposes. The very worthiness of such purposes creates a risk
that the charitable impulses of people may be taken advantage
of by solicitors who would collect funds under false pretenses
or retain for themselves an undue percentage of what they
collected. Fraud in the solicitation of charitable contributions

24(;
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can be most effectively eontl'ollerJ by I1leaSlll'eS such as the
regulation in question rrquiring t.he prescntation of information to ella blr the TlUhlir to determine the nature and worthiness of the purpose for:whictl thE' solicitation is made, and
requiring proof of the gooV ehRl'lH'ler and reputation of paid
solieitors. In the words of :\1r ..Tu!';tiee Shaw, speaking for
a majority of the court in In rc Dart, ]72 Cal. -1-7, 56 rt55 P.
63, Ann.Cas. ln17D ]]27. L.R.A. ~16n n051: "The occupation of soliciting cont.rihutions to charitable purposes is clearly
so far subjcct t.o the police power, that it may bE' regulated by
laws or ordinances providing for a reasonable supervision over
the persons engaged therein, and for the application and use
of the contributions received to the purposes intended, in
order to prevent unscrupulous persons from obtaining money,
or other things, under the pretense that they were to bc applied to charity, and to prevent the wrongful diversion of
such funds to other uses, or to secure them against waste.
Measures reasonabl~' tending to secure these ends are unquestionably valid." (See ('ases ('ollectE'd in 57 A.TJ.R 516,
128 A.L.R. 1361.)
The religious organization in Cantwell v. ()onnecticut,
supra, on which plaintiff relies, solicited funds, not for charitable purposes but for its own support. Under the statute
there involved it was nllowed to engage ill such solicitation
only if the licensing officer determined that its cause was a
religious one and issued a certificate to that cffect. It was
held that the vesting of this power in an administrath'e official
amounted to "censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive" since under the statute the official's judgment was decisive as to what constituted a reiigious cause. The ordinance involved in the present case specifically exempts solicitations for religious purposes only; its
object is to regulate alJ solicitations for charitable purposes.
The Board of Social Service Commissioners has no authority
to appraise the nature or wortfliness of a religious cause. In
the Cantwell case the court recognized that even the solocitation of funds for the support of a religious organization is
subject to reasonable regulation: "The general regulation, in
the public interest, of solicitation, which does not im'olve any
religious test and does not unreasonabl~' obstruct or delay the
collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a reJigious purpose.
Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous
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restraint on the free exercise or religioll or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise." (310 U.S. 296,305.)
Thomas v. Oollins. 323 U.S. 516 165 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed.
430], cited in support of piaintiff"s contentions, "does not
involve the solicitation 'b:r'funds or property." (65 8.0t. 315.
324.) The court thet'e held that a state ('ould not ('onstitutionally require a paid union org,anizer to register with the
Secretary of St.ate before making a, puhli(' speech inyiting a
nonunion worker specifi('all~~ . . lind nonunion workers in the
audience generally to join the union. "We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a
public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite
incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment."
(65 S.Ot. 315, 327.) The court was careful, however, to distinguish cases ill which the speaker solicits funds from the
public: "Once the speaker goes further, however. and engages
in conduct whiel) amounts to more than the right of free
discussion comprehends. as when he undertakes the collection
of funds or securing subscriptions. he enters a realm where a
reasonable registration or identification requirement may be
imposed. In that context sueh !'!olicitation would be quite
different from the solicitation involved here. It would be free
speech plus conduct akin to the activities which were present,
and which it was said the State might regulate. in Schneider
v. Z,'vington, supra, 308 U.S. 147, 84 L.Ed. 155, 60 8.0t. 146.
and Oantwell v. Oonnecticut, 310 U.S. 296. 84 L.Ed. 1213, 60
8.0t. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1452. both supra. That however must be
done and the restriction applied. in such manner as not to
intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly. In
this case the separation was not maintained." In his concurring opinion in Thomas v. Collins Mr. Justice Jackson gives
the following reasons for these variations in state power:
"This wider range of power over pursuit of a calling than
over speech-making is due to the different effects which the
two have on interest.c; which the state is empowered to protect.
The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to
protect the public from those who seek for one purpose or
another to obtain its money. When one does so through the
practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or
the irresponsible, or against unauthorized representation of
agency. A usual method of performing this function is
through a licensing system.
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"But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right,
of the state to protect the public against false doctrine. The
very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose pubHe
authority from assuming a gua rdianship of the publie mind
through regulating the press, -speech, and religion. In thlI
field every person mmlt be )lis own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate
the true from the false for us. West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 31'9.., U.S. ,624, fi::J S.Ct. 1178, ff1
L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674. Nor would 1. Very ma.uy are
the interests which the state may protect against the praetiee
of an occupation, very few are those it may assume to protect
against the practice of propagandizing by speech or prell.
These are thereby left great range of freedom."
[5a] The requirement that promoters and the soliciton
working under them submit proof of their good character
and reputation doe~ not discriminate against plaintiff GIl'
other religious organizations or censor their religious beliefs,
nor does the regulation vest arbitrary power in the administrative board in authorizing it to withhold a license if it
is not satisfied that the applicant is of good character and
reputation. Such a requirement is common in statutes regulating admission to professions and occupations involving
duties of a fiduciary character. (In re Stepsay, 15 Ca1.2d
71 [98 P.2d 489] ; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183 [294
P. 697, 72 A.L.R. 9231; Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal.App. 83
[238 P. 160] ; R~1ey v. Ohambers, 181 Cal. 589, 593 [185 P. 855,
8 A.L.R. 4181 ; Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331 [90 P. 702] ;
Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167 [77 P. 879, 1 Ann. Cas. 13] ;
Gundling v. Ohicago, 177 U.S. 183, 187 [20 S.Ot. 633, 44
L.Ed. 725]; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 [47 S.Ot.
122,71 L.Ed. 331] ; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van. De
Oarr, 199 U.S. 552 [26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305] ; Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U.S. 165 [43 S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590] ; see, also, 12
A.L.R. 1435, 1450; 54 A.L.R. 1104, 1112: 92 A.L.R. 400, 415;
Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, pp. 466-482.) The filing
of a bond is also a common requirement in the regulation
of occupations or activities involving the handliug of entrusted funds. (Palmer v. Oontinen.tal Oasualty 00., 205
Cal. 34, 35 [269 P. 638] ; Olark v. Patterson, 213 Cal. 4 [300
P. 967, 75 A.L.R. 1124] ; Gundling v. Ohicago, supra; People
of the State of 'Kew Yor7, v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 305 [171 N.E.
72, 84 A.L.R. 636]; see 33 Am.Jur., Licenses, sec. 54; 87
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A.L.R. 145; 95 A.L.R. 1224; H)3 A.L.R. 405; 120 A.L.R.
!l50.) [6] The license fee ~ a reasonable one, covering the
('xpenses of investigations and administration.
[5b] The board has no discretion to withhold a license
if t.he applicant's good character all.~ reputation and his
financial responsibility are established and the required bond
is filed. The board is not free to deny licenses, but must act
reasonably in the light of tbe evidence presented. (R~1ey v.
('hambers, 181 Ca1. 589, 595 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418];
Tn re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [203 P. 398]; Tarpey v.
McOlure, 190 Cal. 593, 600 [213 P. 983J ; Bank of Italy v.
Johnson,200 Cal. 1, 32 [251 P. 784]; People v. Globe Grain
and Mill. 00., 211 Cal. 121, 125 [294 P. 31; Oranford v. JOI'dan, 7 Cal.2d 465, 467 [61 P.2d 45]; Leach v. Daugherty,
73 Cal.App. 83 [238 P. 160] ; Hall v. Geiger-Jones 00., 242
U.S. 539, 554 [37 S.Ct. 217, 61 L.Ed. 480]; Graves v. Minnesota, supra, p. 428; Douglas v. Noble, supra, p. 170; New
York ex reI. Lieberman v. Van De Oarr, supra; Plymouth
Ooal 00. v. Oommonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531,
545 [34 S.Ct. 359, 58 L.Ed. 713]; Minnesota v. Probate
Court, 309 U.S. 270, 277 [60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744. 126
A.L.R. 530] ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. 434. 4R!i
[64 S.Ot. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834J.)
The provision empowering the board to re\'okc a license
in case of unfair, unjust, inequitable or fraudlent practices
of solicitation is neither vague nor Wlcertain and affords no
possibility for the censorship of religious beliefs. In Agnew
v. Daugherty, 189 Cal. 446, 448-449 [209 P. 34], this court
upheld a similar provision in the Corporate Securities Act
making the granting of a permit dependent on the commissioner's finding that the "proposed plan of business . . . is
not unfair, unjust or inequitable" and that the methods to
be used to dispose of eecurities "are not such as, in his
opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser thereof." (See,
also, People v. Kuder, 93 Cal.App. 42 r269 P. 198, 6301;
People v. Stewart, 115 Cal.App. 681, 689 [2 P.2d 195];
Yakus v. United States, supra, pp. 426-427. and cases there
cited.)
It is contended that since the trial court fOWld that plaintiff is engaged exclusively in religious activities, the Charities
and Relief Ordinance is rendered inapplicable to plaintiff's
solicitations because of its provision that it "shall not be applicable to solicitations made solely for evangelical, missionary
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or religious purposes." There is no conflict in the evidence,
however, as to what plaintiff's activities are. The issue presented is one of law, namely, whether the charitable purposes
for which plaintiff solicits funds are exclusively religious
purposes within t~e meaning of the ordinance. The' trial ~ourt
erroneously cOlJcluded that becauRI' plaintiff solicit.'l funds
for charitable ~urpo~es as part of it.s religioUR program its
solicitations are solely for religious purposes wit.hin the meaning of the ordinance. The ordinan('e specificall~' differentiates
charitabll' from religious pur{>oses. No person may solicit
"any contribution for any charitable pUl'pose" without complying with the requirements of the ordinance. The ordinance
does not exempt solicitations for charitable purposes undertaken by religious orga.nizations. Solicitations for charitable
purposes, namely, for "philanthropic, !locial service. benevolent, patriotic" purposes, are subje('t to regulation whether
or not they are undertaken by a religious organization. The
intention to maintain a sharp differentiation between charitable and religious purposes is apparent in the provision that
if a solicitation for religious purposes is likely to give the
public the impression that funds are sought for charity. the
board shall "investigate the matter of such solicitation and
give publicity to its findings thereon in such manner as it
rna;\' deem best to advise the public of the facts of the case."
The solicitation of funds to provide food, shelter. and clothing
for those in distress is clearly for It charitable nurpose and
is therefore regulated by the ordinance. Plaintiff admittedly
'lolicits funds for the purpose of giving relief to persons in
distrl'ss. Since this purpose is charitable within the meaning
of the ordinance, plaintiffs' solicitations for that purpose are
subject to the ordinance.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J. t Shenk, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred.
CARTER, J.-J dissent. The majority opinion places the
stamp of validity in toto upon a regulatory ordinance containing requirements so stringent that with their enforcement humble charities and good works must inevitably
bow to
"The organized charity scrimped and iced
"In the name of a cautious statistical Christ."
Admittedly the intrusion into community existence of re-
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ligioms activities characteristic of the secular life brings into
sharp focus the conflicting loyalties to church and state,
t.he clash of religious freedom with, social legislation. (See
Conscience v. The State, by Prog. C. C. McCown, 32 Cal.L.
Rev. 1; Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, by John
Raeburn Green. 43 1\fich.Tj.Rev. 437: Rill of Rights Review
of Am. Bar Ass'n .. vol. 1, .flo. 2.)
, ..
Since 1940 the subject nas been brought '-frequently before
the United States Supreme Court by thc sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses, and that court. has heen alert to protect
the free exercise of religion against abridgement. Its recent
decisions, rendered at a time when the currents of world
thought have been against democracy and toleration, have,
as Professor McCown comments, made a substantial con·
tribution to the defense of the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution, and the emphasis in several of the opinions
upon the rights of "little people," of causes that are humble,
needy, and with financial resources. is particularly notable.
Quoting from the cit.ed article. "The just.ices of the Supreme
Court. echo the language of social and religious protest. from
almost the beginning of history (2500 RC.) in Mesopotamia,
Egypt, and later in Palestine, down to the present day.
Such language is familiar in the Hebrew prophets, the Psalms,
and the Gospels. The obligation of government to protect
the rights of the weak against those- who possess political
and economic power has been repeatedly proclaimed by
prophets. but all too seldom recognized by the powers t.hat
be. Both democracy and religion -demand the protection of
the advocate of unpopular causes. for practically every reo
form, whether political. social. or religious. begins as a protest
against vested interest.-; and majority opinions. . . . In deal·
ing with Jehovah's Witnesses the Supreme Court has shown
a sanity and a considerat.ion for the ultimate issues involved
which cannot but have some effect upon the cowardice of polio
ticians and the impatience of crowds." (32 Ca1.L.Rev., pp.
14, 30.) (See. also, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
r60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352]: Largent v.
Tezas, 318 U.S. 418 r63 S.Ct. 667. 87 L.Ed. 873] ; Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 [63 S.Ct. 669. 87 L.Ed. 869]; Murdock
v. Pennsyl1Jania, 319 U.S. 105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed.
1292, 146 A.L.R. 81]; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 [63
S.Ct. 862, 882, 87 L.Ed. J3131: West Virginia v. Barnette,
319 U.s. 624 [63 S.Ot. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674].),
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In these decisions state legislation impinging upon a claimed
reJigious freedom has been held valid only where there has
been a strong showing of an essential need for regulation
in the interest of the rmblie safety. health, and welfare, or
for the maintenan~ of morals, peace, and order, prote<'tion
against a clear and present danger, or the like.
During the world war, as also pointed out by Professor
McCown, the rise ot nationaJ.ism to the status of a religions
cult and the contemporary sharpening of the Christian conscience revitalized and reali~ed issues that were supposedly
settled. Social problems have'.arisen which are ancient. but
also very modern, and they are made the more difficult
of solution by the traditions and social. political, religious,
and legal philosophies with which they are surrounded. This
country. having just emerged from a great conflict in which
a guarantee of religious liberty to all peoples was a major
aim, should be OIl guard against the subtle undennining,
in the guise of municipal regulation. of those very right.~
which it has gone to such lengths to secure for others. For
this reason the majority holding in the present case. .with
its reactionary trend. is particularly deplorable.
Obviously thE' commission of crime in the name of religion
cannot be tolerated and the state must be safeguarded. The
public are entitled to reasonable protection in community
life, and fanaticism or misguided earnestness cannot be allowed to hold rein over the goodwill of the people. But beyond
situations of emergency and present danger. the field of regulation should be extremely narrow. Thus in Schneider v.
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147. 16] f60 S.Ct. 146. 84 L.Ed. 1551,
the United States Supreme Court. after stressing the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of the constitutional liberties, said: "In every case, therefore. where
legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts
should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise,
the delicate and difficult. task falls upon the courts to weigh
the circumstances and to appraisf' the substantiality of the
reason advanced in '1Upport of the regulation of the free
eujoyment of the rights."
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Using this formula to test the legisl~tion here under review,
it appears that one of the main I"€asons advanced in support
of the regulation is its asserted necessity to protect the publie
from fraud. Resort to the penal statutes and usual methoc1~
of dealing with this evil k'said to afford'1!)sufficient protec·
tion, in that warmhearted and generous ('itizens are especially
vulnerable to solicitations made in the name of a religion or
charity because of the nature of the appeal and their reluctance to turn a deaf ear to any.. cry of the poor and needy.
Thu..<; a delicate social problem is ·posed. Which is the more
important, to give the public added protection. over that
of the penal statutes. against annoyance. inconvenience, and
possible fraud, or to preserve i.ntact the cherished right of
religious liberty T Should the state essay. at the expense of
invasion of a constitutional ri.ght, to protect a citizen from
his own inclination, or perchance his weaknes.<;, in responding
to charitable solicitation without due inquiry into the worth
of the sponsored cause' Is it not more in keeping with the
American tradition to instill in youth and preserve in the
thought of the people that individual independence, Rtrength
of character, moral stamina. and perception which will enable
them to judge personally the good or bad faith of a colporteur
or solicitor and the merit of the cause he espouses'
That some fraud may escape detection is to be anticipated.
This is more or less true in all walks of life despite volume.<;
of protective legislation. But the diversion to wrongful channels of some part of the public contribution to charity is
not a major catastrophe when weighed against the cost of
protection effected only by carving a large slice from the
bill of rights. Indeed it may be asked whether any community can afford to undertake a regulatory program which
may largely deprive the public of the opportunity to hear
and respond to pleas of other than organized and municipally
approved charities, thus !lti1ling the growth and character
development gained by the exercise of pity. compassion, and
generosity. Small are the sums contributed by the average
community to charity when compared with the large amount.q
customarily spent for luxuries and entertainment. In one
sense the benefit of the opportunity to give where the right
hand knows not what the left hand is doing is of more
intrinsic value than the actual raising of the money, for all
are in need of the spiritual enrichment which come.q of free
will offering. There are few housewives who will not cheer-
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fully give from t.llei1' larder to tell itinerant mendicants
rather than run the risk of turning- awa~' hungry one man
wort.h~' of alms. And by the sp.me reasoning there is less
danger from solicitation for unworthy canses than from regulations so string-ent that they ~ma~' C)'ush the humble workers,
the "little people." destro~' th~il' good deedR, impinge upon
their practice of religion. ~nd form a breeding grounos for
intolerance. totalitarianism. or narrow"nationaliRm.
An of this has been given reC'ognition in the decisions of
the United StateR Supreme Conrt. ~ the Cantwell ease it is
said at pages 30R ann 310 "But the people of this nati01l
have ordained in the light of history. that. in spite of the
probability of excesses and ahuses. these liberties are. in
the long view e.~seJJtial t.o enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the cit17:enR of II democracy. The e.~
sential characteristiC' of these liherties is. that under t.heir
shield many types of life. characteI'. opinion and belief ean
develop unmoleRted and unohstrncted. Nowhere is this shield
more necessary than ;n onr own countr~' for a people composed of many raees and of man~' creedR. There are limits
to the exercise of theRe liberties. The danger in these times
from the coercive acth·it.ies of those who in the delusion
of racial or religious conceit wonld incite \·i01enee ann
breaches of the peace in order to denrive otheMl of their
equal right to t.he exercise of th~ir liherties. is emphasized
by event.s familiar to all. The.~e and other transgressions of
those limits the states approprilltely may puniRh. . . .
Equally Ob1,ious ;$ it that (/. state may not unnuly snppress
free comm1(.nic.ation of dews. re7i('fiou.~ or f)ther. under the
guise of conservin('f ncsi1"a'hle cO?lditioll.~. Here we have a

situation analo~ous to a COl1viC'tion under a statute sweeping in a great variet.y of conduct under a generlll ann
indefinite characterization. and 1ea~ing to the executive and
judicial branches too wioe Ii disl'rction in its application."
(Italics ours.)
Again it is said in the Schneider case at page 164: "Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name
of charity and religion, we hold a municipality cannot, for
this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to
present them first to police authorities for their eonsideration
and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some
ideas may. while others may not, he earried to the homes of
citizens; some persons may, while others Ina)" not disseminate
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information from house to house. Frauds may be denounced
as offense~ and punished by law. -: Trespasses may similarly
be forbidden. If it is said that· these means are less effcient
and cOllvenient than bestowal tf power on police authorities
to deeide what illformatio:p may be disseminated from house
to house. and who may impart the inf()rmation, the answer
is that considerations 6f this sort do not":-empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press." The same
is true with respect to abridglPent of the right of religious
freedom. Many recent prolloune~ments of similar tenor might
be added to· those above cited.
Before proceeding to a more detailed review of the legislation here involved, it may be stated that plaintiff is an
incorporated religious organization and that it operates a
mission and store. the latter being called its industrial department. Among its reli~ious activities are the holding of
religious services at its mission by a minister ordained by it,
church services and missionary work. giving away the New
Testament and religious tracts. It conducts its operations in
substantially the follov.1ng manner: Financial solicitors, working from its headquarters, endeavor to obtain money contributions. These contribution.~ are delivered to the treasurer
of the organization and are used for carrying on its religious
activities. The present treasurer has been a solicitor for
plaintiff for many years and retains 30 per cent of the
funds collected. About 50 per cent of the funds are used
for salaries and expenses. The minister's sole compensation
is derived from contributions and it is said to cover no
more than his expenses. Plaintiff also gives assistance in
property and money to those in need. In operating its
store or industrial department it acquires secondhand property, most of which is called salvage, and sold to the public.
The remainder is disposed of as junk. The truck drivers
who collect the property receive a percentage of the salvage, but they do not participate in the proceeds derived
from operation of the store. They also retain all but 10
per cent of the proceeds of the sale of the junk. Solicitors
of salvage work from trucks and receive an average of 50
cents an hour. The store uses its funds for expenses of
operation and occasionally does charity work. The balance
is delivered to plaintiff's treasurer. None of the salvage solicitors distribute plaintiff's religious literature.
Defendant department claims that plaintiff, in operating
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its store, is a "promoter" a1; defined in the city ordinance,
and demands that it obtain a license anthorizing solicitations
for the store. No demand is made in regard to religious activi·
ties, but a religious orga~ization is required to file a notice
of intention and obtain a permit to solicit funds for charitable purposes. Apparently defendant department determines '
whether an organization ·~is soliciting for charity or for
religion and has adopted a l'Ule that 50 per cent of the
amount collected must go for.. charitable purposes.
The trial court found on substantial evidence that plaintiff is a "duly constituted and functioning religious organization, engaged exclusively in the promulgation, by literature
and word of mouth, of its religious beliefs, by and through
its auxiliaries, and in the procuring of donations in the form
of money and articles of value in the prosecution and furtherance of its religious activities," and that if plaintiff is required to obtain a permit and pay a license fee as a condition
of solicitation and receipt of donations "to be used in the
furtherance of said religiou." activities," this "will amount
to a prior restraint on the exercise of [its] religious activities
within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States
. . • an infringement upon the free exercise of . . . religious
liberty as protected by the Constitution."
These findings require a consideration first of the question
whether plaintiff's operations come in whole or in part within
.the exemption provision of the ordinance. Solicitations upon
premises owned or occupied by the association in whose behalf the solicitation is made, and the soliciting of funds from
members of the association are not subject to the promoter,
solicitor, and certain other regulatory provisions of the ordinance. Exemption is also extended to "solicitations made
30ZeZy for evangelical, missionary or religious purposes," but
with the proviso that if such solicitations are conducted in a
manner which, in the opinion of the board, may give those
solicited the impression that the purpose of the solicitation I
is in whole or in part charitable, the board may investigate
the matter and give such publicity to its findings as it deems
best to advise the public of the facts.
In considering the applicability of the exemption to plaintiff's activities it would at first blush appear, and the trial
court concluded, that inasmuch as all of plaintiff's operations,
including its charitable work, are conducted for and as part
and parcel and incident to its religious purpose, all must
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come within the exemption. However, a review of the ordinance in its entirety indicates that by use of the word
"solely" in the exemption clluse, it was intended to differentiate between solicitations for promulgation and support of the religion or church itself,. and solicitations for
charitable work performed as part of t'he religious purpose,
with exemption accorded to the former but not to the latter.
If the exemption is thus unayuilable where the religious organization solicits fOl'charity in connection with the promulgation and exercise of its d~~rine." of religion (and this
seems to be the interpretation placed upon the ordinance by
the rulel': and regulations of the board and by the officers in
enforcing it), then the \Talidity of the regulatory provisions
must be tested by the limitations, if any, which may be imposed upon the exercise of the right of religious liberty.
To a degree the majority opinion recognizes this fact but
it implies, without straightway so declaring, that charitable
undertakings are separable from the religious purpose inducing them, and that by severance they may be removed
to the realm of secular affairs and there by subjected. to
governmental regulation without intrusion of the bothersome
problem of preservation of the constitutional right of reli·
gious liberty. This implication is inherent in the discussion
which starts with the declaration (p. 12): "Many activities
prompted by religious motives can hardly be differentiated
for secular activities. If the applicability of government
regulation turned on the religious mothration of activities,
plausible motivations would multiply and in the end vitiate
any regulation," and proceeds to state (pp. 14·15): "Activities characteristic of the secular life of the community
may properly be a concern of the community even though
they are carried on by a religious organization. . . . Religious
organizations engage in various activities BUch as founding colonies, operating libraries, schools, wineries, hospitals,
farms, industrial and other commercial enterprises. Conceivably they may engage in virtually any worldly activity, but
it does not follow that they may do so as specially privileged
groups, free of the regulations that others must observe..•.
There is no doubt that plaintiff, like many religious organizations, regards the practice of charity as a religious duty.
It is not exclusively a religious activity, however; many
charitable activities spring from sources in ~e everyday
'1 c.2d-t
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life of the community unrelated to religion. The state itself
has an active responsibility for the ,Ylclfare of the poor, the
aged, the sick, the unemployed, and the orphaned. There is
a public interest in regulating- the solicitation of funds for
these purposes. . . ."
..
In the above discU:~sion thc majority opinioll quotes copiously from Prine, v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 [64 S.Ct.
438, 88 L.Ed. 645], a case which has becn criticized as being
out of line with other recent United States Supreme Court
decisions. (See Liberty U"..de?· the Fourteenth Amendment,
supra, at p. 446.)
It is true that religious liberty "embraces two concepts
-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be" (Cantwell
v. Oonnecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296, 303), and that where
the religious organization conducts activities characteristic
of the secular life of the community, they may be subject
to proper regulation under the police power. But, as already
pointed out, this power of regulation. is not unrestricted and
it can only be enforced with due regard to preservation of
constitutional rights. Both freedom of religious thought and
freedom of religious action come within the protection of
the bill of rights. This freedom cannot be whittled away by
carving out segments of religious activities and relegating
them to the realm of secular affairs. If that were permitted, the right of action for a religious purpose could
eventually be destroyed by the gradual severance and classification as secular of every activity undertaken to promote
the religious purpose.
Aside from the pronouncements found in the late federal
decisions, it has long been the law of this state that a charity
conducted as part of a religious practice is inseparable from
the religion itself. The utter impossibility of any severance
is made plain in the case of Application of Dart (1916), 172
Cal. 47 [155 P. 63, Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127, L.R.A. 1916D
905], where in speaking of the Jewish and Christian religions
it is said (pp. 55-56): "In both of these religions charity
is the central word. It is enjoined, not as a good thing, or
a wise thing, or as a kindly thing only, but as a fundamental
part of the religion itself. Says the Jewish faith: 'On three
things the world is stayed; on the Torah (the law) and on
worship and on the bestowal of kindness.' 'Now the end of
the commandment is charity out of a pure heart,' says Paul
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to Timothy. 'Charity is the -:scope of all God's commands,'
preaches Chrysostom. 'All perfection of the Christian life
is to be attained according to charity,' declares Thomas
Aquinas. Does it need more, does it need so much, to show
that in these religions the bestow(ll of clut/'ity, the devotion
of life to charity, are a part of the "'religion itself? And docs
it demand discussion to establish so plain a truth as that
touching religwn there is a doubtful zone which legislation
Rhould be most reluctant to enterT The founders of the nation recognized it when they placed the great guaranty' of
religious liberty in t.he.., constitution of a free people, and
it is for every court to see that that liberty is not encroached
upon and that freedom gnawed and impaired by any experimental legislation however well meant. So when legislation doeR enter that uncertain domain, the fact that it is
there must bring it to condemnation. In accordance with
the dictate of the Constitution itself the doubt will be resolved in favor of religious liberty. And it will be found
better in the long run that the free exercise of religion be
preserved in its integrity, better for the nation, better for
charity itself which owes 80 much to religion, even if th(>
efficiency of religious charities be not up to the standard
of perfection set by the Municipal Charities Commission.
If, under that standard, seventy-five cents of every dollar
would go to the objects of charity, while under the less
efficient methods in vogue but fifty cents of each dollar actually reaches the beneficiaries, it is not to be forgotten that
. there will be many millions fewer of these dollars to be
distributed in charity if the activities of the religious are
hampered, thwarted and stayed." (Italics ours. )
The above comment is extremely apropos. If, under defendants' interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance,
plaintiff is to be denied the benefit of the exemption clause
in so far as its charitable activities are concerned, then the
regulatory provisions of the ordinance must be subjected to
close scrutiny in order to determine whether they infringe
the guarantee of religious liberty. Although concededly acts
of charity. apart from religious motivation, might be performed by the state, or by a professed atheist or nonrcligionist.
nevertheless the evidence here establishes beyond contradiction that plaintiff's charities are an integral part of and
inseparable from its religious purpose. From common knowledtre. and in challen~e to the severance theorY of the mll.ioritv
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OplnIOn, it must be said that acts of charity which do not
stem, consciously or unconsciously, from early religious training or Christian inheritance are sparse ....· It is a matter of
common historical knowledge that public charities and benevolent associations for the gratuitous relief of every species
of distress, are ptculiar to christianity; no otheJ: system of ,
civil or religious policy has originated them; they- form its
highest praise and characteristic feature. The Apostle Paul
in chapter XIII of his . first Epistle to the Corinthians
epitomized his concept of the essential intangibles of Christianity and concluded with the immortal vel'Be: .. And now
abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of
these is charity." Thus charity is the heart and basic principle of plaintiff's religion. To destroy that heart leave''! the
body lifeless. Yet the majority opinion does just that. It
declares charity to be a secular affair in spite of the above
showing to the contrary and thus subjects the exercise by
plaintiff of its religion to unrestricted regulation and ultimate destruction.
Moreover, the anomalous result of the majority opinion
is that a religious organization may use its own funds for
a charitable purpose without hindrance, but if it solicits directly for the charity, the solicitation is subject to the cumbel'Bome ordinance provisions hereinafter discussed. This
makes the matter merely one of the form of the solicitation_
To avoid regulation and gain the protection of the exemption.
the solicitor only needs to make his plea for funds in the
name of his church. The church then receives the donations
and use.e; them for any purpose it may choose, good or bad.
charitable or uncharitable, and it is not reached b~' the
ordinance provisions.
Proceeding now to test the regulatory provisions of the
ordinance as against the claimed infringement of the con- i
stitutional guarantee of religious liberty, it will be noted
that the majority opinion incorporates the provision!' by
marginal reference and then, upon a discussion replete with
generalizations, none of which standing alone can be said
to contain an incorrect statement of the law, it announces
the broad conclusion that, "We find nothing unduly burdensome or unreasonable in any of these provisions" (p. 237);
"In our opinion the classification effected by this ordinance
is reasonable and the standards provided are adequate" (pp.
240-241).
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Were each regulation diseussed hi detail and given separat.e
eonsideration, it is doubtful that even the author of the
opinion would say that none is unduly 6nerous. Section 44.05
imposes upon any person who wishes to 80lieit "any contribution for any dlaritable purpose," a duty of filing with
the department at least ten days prior to the commencement of the work. a written notiee of inteRtion containing
"complete infonnation" upQn eleven eomprEihensive phases
of the undertaking. But a glance at this section shows that
the much maligned income tax formR issued by the federal
government are no more eomplex and demanding than is this
notice of intention in its requirements of itemized data. One
wonders where the average almsman or solicitor is to acquire
the educational baekground to enable him to supply such
statistics. Must the opportunity for exercising one's religion
by doing eharitable work be limited to those who are apt
in reading, writing, and arithmetic T
The solicitor must show (a) "The purpose of the solieitation and use of the eontribution to be solicited"; he must
make (b) "A specific statement, supported by reasons and,
if available, figures, showing the need, for the contribution
proposed to be solieited"; he must show (c) "The character
of such solicitation and how it will be made or conducted."
How can these requirements be fitted into the program of
the itinerant religionist who solicits as he wanders. taking
with the one hand to give freely with the other, reserving
for himself only bare necesRities' What freedom is left for
the missionary and walking preacher who play so colorful
a part on thE' American scene, soliciting their charities,
spreading their doctrines, without preconceived plan and
as each feels himself daily to be guided, and without compiling statistic.q or publishing abroad the good works.
Further requirements of the notice indicate that its enforcement will doubtless effect the disappearanee of all but organized institutions. for the applicant must also show the
following; "( d) The expenses of the solieitation, including
salaries and other items, if any, regardle..~ of from what funds
such expenses are payable; (e) What portion of the contri.
butions collected as a result of the solicitation will remain
available for application to the specific purposes declared in
the Notice of Intention as the object of the solicitation: (f)
A specific statement of all contributions collected or reo
ceived by such person or association within ~ ealendar
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year immediately preceding thc filing of such Notice of Intention. The expenditure or use made of such contriblltions,
together with the names and addresses of an persons or associations receivipg salaries, wages, compensation, commissions or emolument.~ from such contributions, and the respective amounts thereof'; (g) The names and addresses of the
officers and directors' of any such assoeiation for whieh the
solicitation is proposed to be made; (h) A copy of the resolution, if any, of any such association authorizing such solicitation, certified to as a true anE] correct copy of the original
of such resolution by the officer of such association having
charge of the records thereof; (i) A statement that the signers
of such Notice have read and are familiar with the provisions
of this Article and win require all solicitors engaged in such
solicitation to read and he familiar with aB sections of this
Article prior to making any such Rolicitation." This last
quoted provision expressly bars aB who have not attained
a sufficient degree of learning to abide by its terms.
As a whole the involved demands are a far cry from the
simple regulation endorsed in the Cantwell case, to wit:
that "Without doubt a state may protect its citizens from
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to
act for the cause which he purport'! to represent. The state
is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally. in the interest of public safety, peace. comfort or convenience." (810 U.S. at p. 806.) A regulation
such as that described is not unreasonable and affords a sufficient basis for the opening of an investigation in the event
charges of fraud should be lodged against a solicitor. (Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 r68 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87
L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81].) Probably no sincere solicitor
would protest having to register, carry an identification card.
and conduct his activities in a seemly manner and at reasonable hours. But he should be immune from any more onerous
legislative interference, even though to some, his efforts might
appear to be misguided.
The ordinance contains further requirements even more
burdensome than those above set forth. With the notice of
intention there must be filed a statement of any agreement
between solicitors and the organization for which they are
soliciting. (§ 44.06.) Whenever in the opinion of the Board
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of Socia1 Service Commissionem the notice of intention ooeH
not contain sufficient infortpation for the public concerning
the fact.<; required to be therein stated, there must be filed
within 48 hours such additional information as the board
requests. (§ 44.06.) Th~ department J1as power to investigate
the statements in the notice of intention and the method!;
and manner of solicitation. to inspect record!'! of the association for which the solicitation is made. and to issue to solicito~
information cards at four c'et:lt!'! a card. These information
cards are in effect permit!; to solicit and thf'Y must set forth the
facts stated in the notice of intention and such additional
information as in the opinion of the board wilJ be of assistance
to the public in determinin~ the nature and worthiness of
the purpose for which the solicitation is made. (§ 44.03.)
The board may reca]] information card!'! when the~' receive
additional information which rende~ incorrect any statement thereon and amend them. (§ 44.02.) No person shall
emp10y any misstatement. deception. or fraud in connection
with the solicitation (§ 44.04), or use a fictitious name
(§ 44.07). A person may not ROUCit for a charitab1e as.c;ociation unless it maintains records of receipt!'! and disbursements.
(§ 44.08) SolicitorR must have the written authorization of
the organizations they represent. (§~ 44.10. 44.11.) They
must exhibit their information card to the prospective donee
when soliciting (§ 44.12), and file a comp1ete report of their
activities with the board (~44.14). The~' must give receipts
to donees stating various facts. (§ 44.15.) Violation of the
ordinance is made punishab1e as a crime.
In support of its declaration of the validity of these provisions, the majority opinion states that they confer upon
the department no authority to withh01d information cards
when the requirements are met. and it cannot be assumed
that the department will abuse its authority in order to withhold them. This is true, but it is also apparent that a procedure so complex and so costly in time and effort will, so
far as many solicitors are concerned, be prohibitive. It i..~
said in the Cantwell case (310 U.S. 296. 305) that "The
general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation,
which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or de1ay the collection of funds, iR not
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose." Assuming that the provisions
above quoted do not involve any religious test, nevertheless
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they are so demanding as not only to open the door to unreasonable dela~' and abuse of discretion, but also as pos~jhly
to bar certain ('IMlses of solicitors found among the "little
people." Obviously, they do unreasonably obstruct ann delay
the collection of funds
Still more restrictive provisions of the ordinance apply to
so-called ··pro¥loters." who are defined as "any person who
for pecuniary compensation ~l consideration received, or t.o
be received. solicit~ or is engaged in the business of or holds
himself out to the publiC as engaged in the busines~ of Roliclting contributions for or on behalf of any other person or
any charitable association, corporation or institution, or conducts, manages, or carries on ..• or if! engaged in the business of or holds himself out as engaged 1n the bmdness of
conducting, managing or carrying on any drive or campaign
for any such purpose; provided. howe,rer. that pecuniary
compensation or consideration as used herein. shall include,
but shall not be limited to, participation on a percentage basis
in any fund solicited, or raised, for or on behalf of any
other person. firm, association or corporation: provided,
further, that no person who ill a bone fide paid officer or
employee of a social service agency endorsed by the Board
of Social Service Commis.."!ioners, shall be considered a promoter within the meaning of this article." (§ 44.01. )
Section 44.19, subdivision 1, provides that "No promoter
shall in any manner whatsoever, solicit within the City of
Los Angele."! any contribution for any actual or purported
charitable use, purpose, association, corporation or institution
without license from the Board so to do."
Subdivision 2. entitled "Application." states that "To obtain such license, such promoter shall make and file with
the Board an application therefor in writing. In such application, the applicant shall set forth. in addition to· such
information as may be required by the Board: (a) The
name and address of the applicant. . . . (b) A !l1lccinct
statement of facts showing that the applicant ... is of
good character and reputation. . . • (c) The general plan,
character and method in or by which the applicant proposes
to conduct its or his business as a promoter."
Subdivision 3 is entitled "Bond." and states: "At the
time of 80 filing with the Board an application for such
license the applicant shall file and thereafter maintain with
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the Board a good and sufficient bond in the aggregate sum
of ••• $2,000 running to the City of LOR Angeles for the
use and benefit of interested persons and parties. . . . Said
bond shall be conditioned upon the strict compliance, by the
Principal, with the provisions of )his Article and the payment of any direct pecuniary loss sustained, through any
act of grand or petty theft on the part of the Principal,
by any donor pr by any person on whose behalf the funds
or personal property were solicited or 'Teceived by the
Principal. . . ."
Subdivision 5, entitled "Investigation," provides that "The
Board shall examine such application and shall make such
further investigation of the applicant and its or his affairs
as the Board shall deem advisable. If from such examination the Board shall be satisfied: (a) That the applicant
is of good character and reputatiOll. . . . (b) That applicant has sufficient financial responsibility to carry out the
obligations incident to any solicitation such applicant may
make within the City of Los Angeles as such promoter and
that all of the statements made in such application are and
each of them i~ true and that . . . applicant .•• has (not)
violated any of the provisions of this Article or has (not)
engaged in any fraudulent transaction or enterprise, and
that the applicant intends to conduct its business fairly
and honestly, the Board shall issue to the applicant a license to solicit as a promoter within the City of Los Angeles, contributions. Otherwise, the Board shall deny the
application and refuse to issue a license, and shall notify
the applicant of the decision of the Board . . . . "
Under the heading "Revocation," subdh'ision 6 states that
.. All licenses issued hereunder shall be subject to the condition that the applicant thereafter shall cease and desist
from acting as a promoter within said City of Los Angeles
when ordered so to do by the Board if the Board finds after
a hearing . . . that any act or omission of such promoter
.•. in making any solicitation or in the conduct of the business of promoter within the City of Los Angeles is unfair,
unjust, inequitable or fraudulent. The Board must suspend
or revoke any such license if, after hearing upon notice, the
Board shall find the existence of any of the grounds hereinabove enumerated for the denial of an application for a promoter's license; provided, however, that such suspension
or revocation shall be discretionary with the Board if the
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only ground for such rC\'ocatioll is such that it does not
affect tbe licensee's honesty and integrity, or bis ability
properly to perform his duties as a promoter."
Subdivision 7 deals with "Termitiation" of licenses at the
close of each fiscal; year, and snbdivision 8 with "Funds."
The latter subdivision provides that "No promoter shall
commingle any 'hontribution with the promoter's own funds
or property, or fail at any time to mai~tain and keep all
contributions separate 8Jld apart from the promoter's own
funds or property. . . . \:-3) It shall be unlawful for any
promoter to cause or permit any person for pecuniary compensation or consideration received or to be received by such
person to solicit or receive on his behalf or at his instigation,
under his direction or control or in his employment, any
contribution unless such person shall be registered as a
solicitor by the Board. (b) No person shall be so registered
as a solicitor unless he shall first appear personally before
the Board and furnish satisfactory proof that he is a person
of good moral character, that his reputation for honesty is
good and unless he first file with the Board and thereafter
maintain a bond satisfactory to the Board in the sum of
. . . $500.00, conditioned for the payment of any direct
pecuniary loss which may be sustained by the promoter, by
any donee, or by any person on whose behalf any contribution was solicited or received, through any act of grand
or petty theft, committed by such person. (c) The provisions of paragraphs b, c, d, and e of subsection 3, above,
shall apply to bonds filed pursuant to this subsection. (d)
The Board shall collect a fee of ... $1.00 for each such
registration. . . ."
The comment which has been made concerning the unreasonableness of the ordinance provisions relating to solici.
tors applies with double force to tbese "promoter" provisions,
and tbey are also subject to additional criticism.
From the definition of a "promoter," as heretofore quoted
(§ 44.01, supra), it appears that the term is not confined to
business solicitors, such as cmployees of a promotion agency
handling fund raising campaigns, but includes any person
who for pecuniary compensation solicits for another. Many
solicitors for charity are indigent religionists. As an integral
part of the exercise of their religious right they solicit
funds in support of their cause and the charitable activities
incident to it, and of necessity they retain some portion of
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the money collected m order that they themselves may be
clothed and fed. To impose·; upon this class the burden
of posting a $2,000 bond,,pf paying a license fee, and of
showing sufficient financiaf respomdbility to carry out the
obligations incident t'O their solicitation is to seriously impede, if not prohjbit, their undertakings at the outset. A
required qualification of financial &'tanding sufficient to enable
such an applicant to post a $2,000 bond will lleither insure
honesty nor creatc a deterrent against fraud. In many cults
and religions it is traditional that poverty and saintliness
shall walk hand in hand. Many creeds view the possession
of property and assets, or of more money than necessary
for bare essentials, as a manifestation of sins of worldliness.
Yet history shows that some of the finest deeds of charity
and most unselfed works known to man have been accomplished by adherents of these views. It is thus 8 dangerous legislation which would impede the charitable impulses and hamper the undertakings of all but the financially
able-which would give to men of property but deny to the
poor the right equally possessed by both to develop and
carry out the tenets of their creed.
The fee of $25 may not seem large but when it is combined
with the expense and difficulty of obtaining a bond (if indeed such could be obtained by an indigent religionist even
if the premium were paid for him), and establishing the
vague condition of "financial responsibility," it involves cumulative burdens too heavy to be borne. In seeking to justify
its declaration of the reasonableness of these provisions, the
majority opinion states that the filing of a bond is "a common requirement in the regulation of occupations or activities involving the handling of entrusted funds," and that
"The license fee is a reasonable one, covering the expenses
of investigations and administration" (p. 20). This latter
statement may have been inspired by the fact that the late
federal decisions speak of the distinction between a license
fee solely to defray the costs of enforcement of a regulatory
statute and one for revenue purposes, condemning only the
latter. But here, even if the regulatory provisions of the ordinance were otherwise reasonable as applied to religionists
and justified the imposition of a fee sufficient to meet the
costs of administration, there is no indicll.tion whatsoever that
those costs would amount to $25 for the handling of each
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application or that that sum was fixed in contemplation of
reimbursement for expenses.
The following excerpt from Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, pp. 111-113 [63 S.Ot. 8'70, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292,
146 A.L.R. 81], is pertinent: "It is plain that a religious
organization needs funds to remain a going concern . . . .
Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, fre~dom of religion
are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own
way. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax
the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close ibl doors to all those who do not have a full
purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can
deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from
them a part of the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation. • . . In all of these cases the
issuance of the permit or license is dependent on the payment of a license tax. And the license tax is fixed in amount
and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners or
to their realized revenues. It is not a nominal fee imposed
as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing
the activities ill question. It is in no way apportioned. It
is a :fiat license tax levied and collected as a condition to
the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by
the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance
those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. . • . So, it may
not be said that proof is lacking that these license taxes either
separately or cumulatively have restricted or are likely to
restrict petitioners' religious activities. On their face they
are a restriction of the free exercise of those freedoms which
are protected by the First Amendment ..•• Itinerant evangelists moving throughout a state or from state to state would
feel immediately the cumulative effect of such ordinances as
they become fashionable .. The way of the religious dissenter
has long been hard. But if the formula of this type of ordinance is approved, a new device for the suppression of
religious minorities will have been found. This method of
disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out
by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted
town by town, villa.ge by village. The spread of religious
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ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry
of numerous religious groups would be stopped."
It will further be noted that !pe provision defining "promoters," as heretofore quoted (§ 44.01, supra), includes a
special exemption runniIig in favor of bona fide paid officers
and employees of soe'ial service agencies endorsed by the
board. The conditions which a social service agency must
meet to secur~ endorsement are set forth in a detailed separate
ordinance, the relevant porticlt!,s of which are incorporated
in the majority opinion by marginal reference. One condition is "(h) That the officers and employees of such corporation or association are persons of good moral character
and reputation and that the corporation or association has
exercised reasonable care in selecting persons of good moral
character and reasonable experience as solicitors for its
funds."
Apparently no bonding or license requirement is imposed
upon these solicitor-employees, or in their behalf upon the
organization they represent. Thus the solicitors for the organized charity hold a great primary advantage over the
unorganized worker, with no sound reason for the discrimination. Graft and corruption can flourish, and fraud can
emanate from high places as well as low, and through organization these evils are sometimes hidden and the more securely
entrenched. Also the percentage of contribution retained to
meet the expenses and recompense the employees of charitable
institutions is apt to be higher than that retained by unorganized workers or sincere and humble religionists who
sacrifice all in the practice of their religion. Abuses and
breaches of trust do occur but who can say that the hazard
is greater in unorganized classes of workers, whose illicit
gains are probably small, compared with what is lost when
a large institution becomes permeated with corruption.
Vital need exists for the individual as well as for the organized worker in both charitable undertakings and general
benefits derived from the spreading of religious doctrines.
There are many dark places where the light of organized
charity does not penetrate-many needy whom it does not
reach. To these people the tender ministrations of sincere
and unfettered religionists bring succor and salvation. The
unreasonable curtailment of this activity merely because some
are addicted to fraudulent and deceitful practices in the
name of charity, is as unthinkable as would be the dis-

270

./

GOSPEL ARMY tI. CITY OF

Los ANGELES

[27 C.2d

solution of established institutions merely because dishonesty
and corruption have at tim~ been uncovered in their adIilinistration. The public jl.s a whole cannot be freed from
the entire power of gecision as to the worth of the cause
ror which they are solicited or their inclination to con1 ribute. 1f the constitutional p;ua!"~ntees are to be upheld.
then the puhli(' mm;t expect to bear some portion of the
Inll"den of seeing that their gifts are mad(' only to worthy
and honestly administered 'causes.
Another objectionable provision of the ordinance is that
wllich requires the promoter to furnish "a succinct statement of facts showing that the applicant __ . is of good
('hllracter and reputation." Those who contribute to charity
are not so much concerned with the "reputation" of the
solicitor as they are with the intended use to which the donations are to bE' put. A most wicked man of public ill repute
may espouse a very worthy cause or do a very good deed.
Religionists and reformers are often called from the gutter
whence they return to make expiation for their wrongdoings
by trying to save others from a like fate and to aid the
redemption of those who may already have strayed. Forceful
and effective work has been done by the reformed. turned
reformer. and many of these people labor on without affiliation
with any recognized institution and without financial help
other than that g-leaned through solicitation.
Hence, it would seem that if any statement is to be demanded in connection witll a reasonable requirement for
registration and identification it should embrace no more
than an averment of present honesty and sincerity in the
disbursement of money and propert~- for the purpose for
which they are solicited. Reputation is not an issue.
The requirement of section 44.19 that the officials may
make an investigation and if "satisfied" that the applicant is
of "good character and reputation" they may issue a license.
places upon the applicant the burden of establishing this
requirement as a condition precedent to the exercise of his
right of religious liberty. Such a requirement is not a sufficiently fixed and definite standard to safeguard the free
exercise of the constitutional right here involved. In the
exercise of their power the officials might conclude that an
applicant does not qualify merely because of their opinion
concerning his particular religious belief and creed. The
way of the dissenter is usually hard and by reason of his
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views his reputation in the eyes of a large group, or a
majority, may be far from good and his character at least
questionable if not downright immoral. What fair qualification to the right of religious liberty can be conceived which
limits i1.<; exercu;f' to those who have good reputation and
character, and denie.<; it to those who haye not?
It is said in Murdock v. Pennsyl'lJb,tJia, supra (319 U.S.
105, 116): "Plainly II cOlllmunit~· may 'hot suppress, or the
state tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. If that device were ever
sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready instrument
for the suppression of the faith which any minority cherishes
but whic}] doe.o; not happen to be in favor. That would be a
complete repudiation . . . of the Bill of Rights." And again
in Oantwell v. Oonneticut, supra, (310 U.S. 296, 310): "In
the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error t.o his neighpor. To persuade
others t.o his own point of view. the pleader, as we know,
at times, resorts t.o exaggeration. t.o vilification of men who
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even
to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of hilrt.ory, that. in spite of the probabilit~· of excesse.'l and abuses. these libertie.q are, in the long
view. essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on
the part of thE" citizens of a democracy."
Subdivision fi of section 44.]9 of the ordinance is also
subject to criticism. Tt authorizes the revocation of the license
where the licensee. in making thE' !lolicitation, is unfair, unjust, inequitable. or fraudulent. Thp,se grounds. except the
one last stated. arE' vaguE' and uncertain and may well result in the samE' religiou~ censorship arising from a determination of good charact.er and reputation.
Suhdivifdon 8 of the !lection. dealing with the qualifications of solicitors for promoters, is subject to the same objections as the rest of the section. The only difference is
the amount of the fee and the size of the bond. It requires
a "good moral character." and fI reputation for honesty
that is good.
It is not an obstacle to plaintiff's attack on seetion 44.19
that it has not sought a license or that if the publie officials
act arbitrarily their aetion is subject to jurisdictional review.
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The section on its face operates BB a prior censorship on
the free exercise of religious liberty; (Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra.)
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There is another ordinance which concerns the regulation
of pawnbrokers, secondhand dealers, and junk dealers (Lo..'1
Angeles Municipal Code. § 24.0,1), Although its provisions
must be considel'£d in relation t<1" the operation of the store
or so-called industrial department of plaintiff. the subject
need not be developed here, for from thl' evidence it is clear
that the store partakes of ..enough of the character of a commercial enterprise to justify the restrictions imposed. In
the main I can concur in the conclusions (although not the
reasoning upon which they are based). expressed in the
majorit~· opinion with respect to this phase of the case. The
store is not conducted as a profiit making institution but it
is in the business of selling used property. The operations
of junk dealers and pawnbrokers have long been recognizeCl.
as a distinct class of business b'Ubject to regulation under the
police power in order to facilitate the recovery of stolen property and the preservation of health. (See 43 C.J. pp. 389ano; 43 ld. 410-411; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law. § 189.)
It is not contended that the regulatory provisions of section 24.01 are invalid if considered apart from the question
of thl' guarantee of religious liberty. Even BBsuming that
the s~ction mUb1: be viewed in the light of the right of free
exercise of religion, there '1eems to be nothin!! arbitrary
or um'eusona ble in its regulatory requirement.'1. The measure
is patentl~' II police regulation and the specified fee is not a
tax for revenue. That fee doe..<: not have combined with it
the other financial burdens imposed under the ordinance
dealinlZ with promoters and hence it i.<: distinguishable, Moreover. the operat.ion of the more has most of the aspects of
an ordinary commercial enterprise.
Such ordinance (I.Jo..<: Angeles Municipal Code, § 24.01)
provides that persons who are to engage in the regulated
busine..'Is mU!~t annually apply for and receive a written permit. Under subsection (c). entitled "Requisites of Pennits,"
it specifie.... the followinJ! requirements or "Rt8.ndards": (1)
The original application must state "by street and number
the place where such business is proposed to be conducted"
or, in the case of junk collecton; having no fl~ed place of
business, "their residence by street number." The appUca-
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tion "shaH be signed by the applicant and Hhall contain his
residence address." (2) The payment in advance of an annual fee of $25 ($50, if jewelry. watche!-> "or similar Hecondhand merchandise" is to be dealt in). (3) Upon receipt
of the application "the Boa?dshall cause to be investigateil
the business of t.1re applicant and location at which applicant
proposes to engage in busine.c;s as specified in said application. Thereaft.er the Boaril rna:\, issne a permit . . . for the
remaining portion of t.he 'Nlfrcnt' ~·ear." (4) Persons operating under the ordinancE' must "ciernre an annu:11 renewal
of su(>h permit commencing .lanua~- 1st of t.he c;ucceeding
year." (5) Persons holding "an orrlina~'" permit must
apply for and secure a "special penn it. " "in t.he manner
provided . . . for securing ordina~' permits." beforE' ilea ling
in "!'Iecondhand jewelry. precion~ ..1 on es. prec.iou~ metals.
. . . watches or other similar seconilhanrl merchandise."
Further regulation!': or "stanrlarrls" !let b~' the ordinance
incluile the following: "The Boaril <;hall not grant any permit . . . to persons who fail. refm~e or negle(>t to comply
with the laws and ordinanceI': relating to anil regulating the
business for which !'IUch permit iFl sou!!ht": "If pel'!'lons holding permits . . . shaH "iolnte any of t.hE' provi!':lons of t.his
Section [the Municipal 00de !lection "Iettin!! forth the ordinance in quec;tion 1 or any provision of any other ordinance,
or any law relating to 01' regulating any !luch busineR-c;. or
shall conduct 01' carry on !'IUch bu.sineR.s in an unla'wful man·
ner, the Board ... shall revoke !'IUch permit." but only upon
following the proce.dure "in the manner provided in Section 22.02 nf this Code" (whieh proceilure lS not flue<;tioned);
permh holde~ ushall filE' (hlily reports. on fonn!! provideo
by the Chief of Poli(>e. listin!! the merchandi"e received or
purchased on the pree.eding- da~·. t.he hour of !'IUch re(>eipt
or purchase, the "trl1(, name and addr('$s of the party making
the sale. delivery or pled~e aFI nearly 81'1 the Rame iFl known
to or can be ascert.a.ined by mch pel'!'lon together with a description of such party." thE' number of the pawn t.ieket
issued. if a pledge i!! involv('d. and the amount loaned. and
a description of each article pledged. received 01' purchased.
The permit holder is also refjuired to keep "a complete record of all goaW . . . pledged to or purchased or received
by him" which record "Rha 11 be open at all times during business hours to the inspection of any member of the Police

Department."
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The mentioned provision!': (and the same i!': true of the
further provision~ not herein epitomized) are not unreasonabl~ or uncertain. Subs1antially nothing more is required
for an original permit than th~ payment of the moderat.e
fee and the filing. of the written and signed application giving
the data a~ to tlie location of the proposco hnsine~~ and the
applicant'~ Ti'!ime and re.<;idenee adilres!':. Th(' requircment!':
for complianre with law anil t.he keeping and tiling of reports. etr .. after comIlJencing husiness. nre reasonahly related
to t.he nature of th(' blJl;;iness fmil t.he purpo!':es of the regulations. These latter provisions furnish a proper and exclusive
standard for guidanre of the board in passing on applications
for renewal!: of permit.s or proreedinrrs to re,roke permits.
The very moderate requirements for ori~rinal iSS1UtnCe of permits, hereinabove set forth. leave little if anything, beyond
the RllitabiHty of the proposeil location. to the dhlcretion of
the board. This orilinance fullv meets the const.itutional requirement." that regulatory' law~ of this type establish reasonable standardl'l for the guidance of the permit-isRlling board.
Defendans contend t.hat injunctive relief il'l not !l.vailable
to plaintiff and that there is no showing of irreparable injury.
Generally. publir office~ may be enjoined from enforcing
an unconstitutiona.l statute. and !!ection 526 (4) of the Code
of Civil Proceilnre and Reetion ~424 (4) of the Civil Code
have no application t.o !!\lch !'Iituations. (Brock v. Superior
Court, 12 Ca1.2d 605 f86 P.2d 8051: Rueneman v. City of
Santa Barbara, 8 Ca1.2d 40fi f65 P.20 884. 109 A.hR. 8951.)
Where a criminal <;tatute or ordinance causes irreparable
damage to property rights. the injureil party may attack
its constitutionality in an 8ction t.o enjoin its enforcement.
(See Jones v. City of Los An.qeles, 2]] Cal. ~04 r295 P 14];
Sullivan v. San Francisco Oas etc. Co .. 148 Cal. 368 f83
P. 156, 7. Ann.Cas. !l74. 3 L.R.A.N.R 4011: 1.0s Angeles T.
Ins. Co. v. Los Angeles. 52 Cal.App. 152. 156 f]98 P. 1001];
San Diego T. Ins. Assn. v. East .~an Diego, 186 Cal. 252 r200
P. 393. 17 A.L.R 5131; and Abbey Land etc. Co. v. San Mateo, 167 C81. 434. 438 f]39 P. 1068. Ann.CaR. ]915C 804. 52
L.R.A.N.R 508].)
An interference with the solicitation by plaintiff of contributions is an interference with its property rights in the
sense that its right to collect and then use the funds will be
impeded. Even if it be aSSllmed that no injury to property
rights is threatened, it seems that injunctive relief would
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be appropriate to restrain the enforcement of. a criminal
statute where the attack thereon conRiRtR of a bona fide claim
that the statute violates one of the personal liberties guaranteed by the ConRtitution, and that claim is not wholly
lacking in merit on its face. In...such case the injury consists of the consequenceR of the enforcement of the law to
the person, viewed in the light of the exalted Rtanding of
the conRtitutional guarantee..c;. These cbllsequences under
the procedur~ in this state are serious. '.
A violatiOli' of the ordinance being a misdemeanor, the
ca:Je would be cognizable only in an inferior court. From
that court the only appeal available is to the superior court,
or to its appellate department. If that court denied relief
plaintiff would have no recourse to thiR court or the district
court of appeal by appeal or certiorari, although in the event
of being imprisoned he would have the remedy of habeas
corpus. (Portnoy v. SU1)erior Cow·t, 20 Ca1.2d 375 [125
P.2d 487].) The cases heretofore ci1ec1 are not determinative
of the point. They merely state the rule that injunctive relief will be given if injury to property rights is threatened.
That does not exclude such relief where the injury is to
personal rights.
It has been recognized that personal rights may be protected by equity, and they obviously should be, as they are
more sacred than property rights. It is said in 28 American
Jurisprudence, Injunctions, section 71: "However, there have
always been some clearly defined exceptions to the general
rule, and there is a progressive tendency on the part of the
courts to remedy by injunction, injuries to personal rights.
This is, perhaps, as it should be, because the personal rights
of citizens are more sacred and, by every test, of more value
than things that may be measured by a purely monetary
standard, and the courts have expressed difficulty in understanding why injunctive protection of the one class of rights
should be placed above similar protection of the other. It
lllr.y be added that the courts with great uniformity base their.
jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights by injunction
nominally on an alleged property right, where in fact no
property rightR are invaded, so that the rule seems to be
one of those known chiefly by its breach rather than its
observance." (See, also, 14 A.L.R. 295.) Section 526 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not limit the injury to property
rights. On the contrary it authorizes an injunction where
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th(' acts would produce great or irreparable injury "to a
party to the action." (Italics ours.) (See Na,tion v. Chism,
154 Okla. 50 [6 P.2d 7661.)
For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion that
the judgment of the trial-"court should be modified by restricting the injunctive relief to alJeged violations of all provisions of the Municipal Code here involved except section
24.01 which I b~lieve to be valid." '"
Schauer, J., concurreq..,
"

)

)

EDMONDS, J.-In this case, the trial court, upon undisputed evidence, found that the Gospel Army was soliciting
donations for the purpose of furthering its religious activities. Because these fund.q are used in part for the purpose of giving relief to persons in distress, Mr. Justice Traynor declares, as a matter of law, its activities are charitable
and not religious. I cannot concur in that conclusion, nor in
the construction of the Los Angeles Municipal Code as requiring the issuance of permits to either organizations or promoters without an appraisal of "the nature or worthiness of a
religious cause." And if, contrary to the evidence and findings of the trial court, the Gospel Army, as a matter of law,
is a charitable institution, then, by the challenged ordinance
it is arbitrarily denied the right to exist unless it complies
with undisclosed standards of the commissioners and carries
on its operationR in accordance with arbitrary and unreasonable regulations.
AB Mr. Justice Henshaw pointedly stated in considering
an earlier ordinance of the city of Los Angeles, which, like
the one now before the court, gave municipal authorities broad
and arbitrary power over every institution ministering to
human suffering and spiritual need, charity is a fundamental
part of religion. Speaking of the work of the Salvation Army,
he said: "Profoundly impressed with the Founder's sympathy for the poor and afflicted, and with His teachings that
'Now abideth faith, hope and charity, these three, but the
greatest of these is charity,' and 'Now, the end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart,' it has made its
special field of religious work the relief of the destitute and'
the rescue of society's outcasts. It has found that it cannoti
lead the spirit of the weary and heavy burdened without first:
ministering to his physical necessities. While 'man d()Gll~t
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live by bread only,' he cannot live at all without bread. Therefore, the charitable organizations of the Salvation Army are
vital, integral parts 01 its religious life ano work." (In re
Dart, 172 Cal. 47, ~ [155 P. 63, Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127, L.R.A.
1916D 905).)
The Gospel Army also endeavors to gain converts for its
religious doctrines and carfies on actiYities which minister to
material need. Th& expense aT conducting its work is largely
met by donations of money and secondhand goods !ilolicited
from the public. The net proceeds from each of these main
sources of income go into the Army's treasury from which is
paid the cost of religious services, free distribution of tracts
and religious literature, as well as food, lodging, clothing and
other necessaries for those in need. The record discloses no
segregation of such funds on the books of the Army as being
for a religious or for a charitable purpose. Upon this evidence
the trial court found that if the Gospel Army is required to
comply with the provisions of the ordinance, such enforcement "will amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of their
religious activities within the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States. • . ." Mr. Justice Traynor sweeps aside
the evidence and the trial court's findings upon the ground
that, as a matter of law, charity has no place in religion, and
whenever an organization carrying on religious activities steps
aside from the promulgation of its spiritual doctrines to extend a helping hand by the alleviation of human suffering, it
becomes subject to onerous and restrictive regulations. So narrow a view of the practice of religion runs counter to all
of the fine principles of human conduct which, more and more,
are leading men of good will to help those less fortunate along
the daily path. A religious man, it has been said, is one "whose
light shines in the dark places of the earth through righteous
acts and helpful deeds."
Large groups of citizens of every faith and creed are regularly devoting much time and effort, at great personal sacrifice, to the cause of those who are in need. If the work in
behalf of the less fortunate among us is done in the name of
or in connection with the promulgation of a religious doctrine, then the Los Angeles ordinance authorizes the Department of Social Service to add to the indifference, inertia and
self-interest which solicitation must always overcome, either
the condemnation or damnation by faint praise of an offirial
bureau which is authorized to reach a conclusion without
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rcgal'd to anything but the personal opinion of some administrative officcI' as to t lIe wOl'l hinr~:s of the purpose. Whatever
is done in the name 'of religion for a charitable purpose, the
ordinance declares in effect, is to be viewed with suspicion
and distrust. 1'here can be preaching without official intervention, but any pr~ctice of Christian virtues is to be carried
on only under tKe watch/1M eye of the Department of Social
Service according to its notions of "the public interest." And
yet my associates say that such legislation lays no restraint
upon religious freedom. ' ....
It is, of course, true that reasonable regulations may be
imposed upon an organization carrying on religious activities.
The rule, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States,
is that "The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not
unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose." More specifically, the court
declared that" A state may protect it.o; citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community,
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and authority to act for the cause
which he purports to represent." (Oantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, at pp. 304, 306 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128
A.L.R. 1352].)
But the ordinance here challenged goes far beyond these
limits. As the statute reads, its provisions shall not be applicable "to solicitations made solely for evangelical, missionar~·,
or religious purposes." These terms are not defined, yet the
lawmakers provided "that in any case where it shall come
to the attention of the Board that any solicitation has been
or is being intended to be made for evangelical, missionary
or religious purposes but in such manner as in the opinion of
the Board is calculated to give or may give the impression
to the person or persons solicited in an~T such solicitation or
to the public that the purpose of such solicitation is either
in whole or in part charitable. then the Board, if in its
opinion the public interest will be subserved thereby, shall
investigate the matter of such solicitation and give publicity
to its findings thereon in such manner as it may deem best to
advise the public of the facts of the case." (§ 44.16.) If this
curious language means anything, it extends the exemption
to an~T solicitation in behalf of a religious organization for a
purpose in whole Ol' in part charitable but allows the Board
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of Social Commissioner~ to ~tatr. to the public, "in such manner as it may deem best," its official disapproval of any such
practical application of the Mru;;ter's teachings to human need
or of the methods by which help is being extended. Under that
construction of the exemption provision, no license for the
appellant's solicit'ations mny be refJuired. But it probabl~'
would be morl disast.rous to the work of a religious organiza·
tion to arbitrarily and publicly condemn its activities than t.o
require it to obtain a license, and equaIly violative of consti'\
tutional guarantees.
Considering the provisions of the ordinance from the
standpoint that, under its express terms, only solicitation for
contributions to meet the expense of doctrinal church activities is exempt from regulation, although the good works done
by an organization such as the Gospel Army are, to borrow
Mr. Justice Henshaw's words. ",·it.al. integral parts of its religious life and work," no person may solicit a contribution
for its sUPPArt who has not obtained an "information card."
Such a card is issued by the Department of Social Service only
following the filing of a "notice of intention" to solicit,
which shall include the detailed information specified by section 44.05 of the code. (Ante, p. 251.) This information is
not limited to facts relating to the identity of the proposed
solicitor and his authority to act for a particular organization. Also there must be submitted detailed information relating to the organization's purpose and business affairs and
those who are supporting it financially or employed in its aetivities. In short, all of the data demanded concern the merits of the cause which is asking the public for assistance and
the scope of the work it is carrying on.
Moreover, the information card which allows one to solicit,
providing he presents it to the person who is approachced for
a donation, "allowing him sufficient opportunity to read the
same, before accepting any contribution. . . . " (§ 44.12), is
not issued as of CQurse upon the filing of the notice of intention. There is neither requirement nor even suggestion in
the ordinance to support Mr. Justice Traynor's assertion that
these cards, "which are in effect permits to solicit, are issued
automatically upon the filing of the required information and
the payment of the 4¢ for each card." On the contrary, the
Department of Social Service shall have the power: "(a) To
investigate the allegations of the Notice of Intention, or any
statement or reports; (b) To have access to and inspect and
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make copies of all books, records and papers of such person,
by or on whose behalf any solicitation is made; (c) To investigate at any time the methods of making or conducting any
such solicitation ..... " (§ 44.03.)
A majority.of the court sanction the indefinite terms of
the ordinancE'·' relating to the issuance of a permit upon the
pre!>umption that the Board of Social Service Commissioners
will fairly investigate the facts in' oonnection with each application and prompt.ly make a determination upon them. It may
not be assumed, say mv associates. that the board will whimsically or caprlcio~sly' deny an application. and the courts
will relieve from unjust and arbitrary action. The same argument was advanced by the state in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
supra, and summarily rejected. The opportunity to obtain
judicial correction, said Mr .•Justice Roberts, speaking for
the court, does not justify interference with constitutional
rights. " ... The availability of a judicial remedy for abuse..q in
the system of licensing st.ill leaves that system one of previoUR
restraint which, in the field of free speech and press. we have
held inadmissible. A statute authorizing previous restraint
upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action." (p. 306.)
Moreover. the inQuisitorial authority of the department is
a continuing one. "Whenever. in the opinion of the Board
of Social Service Commissioners t.he Notice of Intention does
not disclose sufficient information for the public concerning
the facts ... reqnired to be stated in such Notice or concerning the person or association making such solicitation or on
whose behalf such scolicitation is made. then. upon the request
of said Department. there shall be filed. in writing, within
forty-eight (48) hours after such request, such additional
information as may be required by said Board upon the foregoing subjects." (~44.06.) This right may be exercised after
the Board has made an investigation. and there is no limitation upon the time within which inquiries must be concluded.
Also, there is no restriction upon the number of additional
requests the board may make for information. or any time
fixed in the ordinance to prevent the board from taking months
~ look into the purpose and scope of an organization's activities; designed delay is invited by the censorious terms of
the legislation, and the widests discretion is given to harass,
condemn, delay and obstruct. And if perchance the appli-
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cant represents an unpopular cause, then the authority of the
Board of Social Service Commh;sioners to publish the results
of its investigation~ "l,).y such means as may be deemed best
to reach the general public and persons interested" (§ 44.02)
gives opportunity for the l1n(\ermining of public confidence
and provides a vehiele for offieinl propaganda which may do
'.
irreparable damage.
Occasion for discrimination is also afforded by sp.ction
44.03 which allows the. Department of Social Service to issue
an information card in h form st.ating either that the authori-'
zation given doe..c; or does not constitute an endorsement of
the charitable association for which solicit.ation is to be made.
Moreover, the information card may show the pertinent facts
set forth in the notice of intention and any additional information "as shall in the opinion of the Board be of assistance
to the public to determine the nature and worthines::; of the
purpose for which the solicitation is made.... " The information card which the solicitor must carry with him, and
either read to each prospective contributor or present to such
person for his perusal. allowing him sufficient time to read
it before accepting any donation, may therefore be a sizable
volume of data which in practice, if not in purpose, will effectively block public support of an organization which has a
legitimate purpose and against whieh no criticism justly may
be made.
To meet the demands of the city, the receipt required for
each donation must be signed by the solicitor and contain "in
addition to a description of the amount and kind of the contribution, RUbstantially the following matters: (a) The name
of the association, if any, in whose name or upon whose behalf the solicitation is made. (b) A statement 8.R to whether
the contribution solicited is to be applied for the r;eneral purposes of RUch association. if any, or for specific purposes, and
if for specific purpose..~ the nature thereof shall be clearly
stated. (c) A statement that the Information Card, issued
by the Department, was presented to the person making the
contribution for his perusal prior to receipt by the solicitor
of the contribution receipted for . . . ." (§ 44.15.) Only by
means of a traveling office could a solicitor comply with all
of these requirements.
AP. justification for his position, Mr. Justice Traynor &8serts that "activities characteristic of the secular life of the
OQ1DUI.uniV may properl,y be a ooneern of the community even
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though they are carried o~ by a religioUs organization." A
host of decisions is cited in support of that statement. But
the cases relied upon ~re authority only for the proposition
that certain activities such as the sale of religiom; periodicals
by minors. beating" a drum on .the traveled portions of the
city streets. and parades. carr~ed on by a church. are
subject to reasonable re~lation by the state under its
police power; they do not J1Urport to declare what may be
done in the field of reasonable regulation of solicitation for
religious purposes. Indeed. excluding Tn re Dart, supra, only
two of them concerned the constitutionality of a statute regulating the solicitation of funds. One of these two, Prince v,
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 r64 S.Ct. 438. 88 L.Ed. 645],
upheld a statute restricting the activity of minors. The other
decision. 'Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. ]05 r63 S.Ct.
870. 87 hEd. 1292. 146 A.hR. 8] 1. expressly excluded consideration of the question now in controversy, for the court
declared that there was no iR.crne before it in regard to a reg-'
istration system for solicitors.
As to Tn re Dart, supra, the statement from it which is
quoted in the majority opinion has no application to solicitation for religious work: it concerns the reg'nlation of organizations which seek contributions for charitable purposes. The
declaration that under the police power. there may be reasonable supervision over persons eng-aged in the occupation of
obtaining money from the public for the maintenance of an
organization carrying on charitable work is followed by the
pronouncement: "Even' person has the right. under our constitution. and perhaps without its g"llarantee. to solicit contributions for a worthy (',haritable purpose. provided he acts
in good faith and honestl~' applie~ them to that purpose.
The ordinances give the commission power to deprive persons of that right without cause or reason. To the extent that
they give thi!" arbitrary power they are contrary' to the constitution and void." (1n re Dart. supra, at p. 57.) Certainly
the constitutional g"llarantee give..o: as much, if not greater.
protection to religious endeavors which include ministration
to relieve human suffering. For as Jame..<: wrote concerning
faith without works. "If a brother or Rister be naked. and
destitute of daily food. And one of you say unto them. Depart in peace, be ye warmE'd and filled: notwithstanding ye
give them not those things which are needful to the body;
what doth it profit" Jas. 2: 5, 16.)
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But if the practice of religion may be legally isolated
beyond the contaminating reach of charity, then, in my
opinion, the legislation is vultlerable to attack as unlawfully
circumscribing the' activities of every organization which earries on its work without the profession of religious doctrille.
Unquestionably the occupation of t.he'·!\plicitation of contrihutions for charitable purpOSeR may be subjertC'd to regulation.
but legislatures or municipalitjes may not. under the guise
of the police power. impose unnecessary and unreasonable
restrict.ions upon t.he use of private propert~' or the pursuit
of useful activitie.s. (J{r.Kn1! .Jewelers Inc. v. Rowron, 19
Ca1.2d 595 rI22 P.2d 543. 13n AJ.J.R ]]881: In re Fuller,
15 Cal.2d 425 f]02 P.2d 3211: Skn7ko v. nit11 of Sunnyvale. 14
Ca1.2d 213 r93 P.2d 931: Tfl. re Monro1,i.a E1'enifln Post. 199
Cal. 263 r248 P. ]017): Prost v. City of T,os Angeles. 181 Cal.
22 [183 P. 342. 6 A.hR. 4681: Ex pnrtc TJirl'MI. 144 Cal. 234
r77 P. 924. 103 Am.St.Rep 82. 1 Ann. Cas. 428. 66 L.RA.
9281; Larson v. Bush, 29 Cal.App.2d43 r83 P.2d 9fi51.)
Also the general and indefinite terms used in the ordinance
wholly fai1 to meet the constit.utional requirement that a
regulatory statute mllst Rpecify II standnrd for offici a I a('tion.
(In re Dart, supra: Hewitt v. Statf' Roard of Medica} Examiners. 148 Cal. 590. fi93 fR4 P. 39. 113 Am.fh.Rep. 315.
7 Ann.Cas. 750. 3 L.RA.N.S. ~961: Schae.zlein v. (!ananiss,
135 Cal. 466. 469 r67 P. 7!'i5. R7 Am}=lt..Rep. ]22. fi6 L.R.A.
733]; Oount'J.I of Lo.~ Anrrel('.s v. Holl111ftood C('.me.ter1/ Assn.,
124 Cal. 344. 349 f57 P. 153. 71 Am.~t.Rep. 751: 1i:x parte
Sing Lee. 96 Cal 3M. ~59 r::n P. 245. 31 Am.St.Rep. 218,
24 L.R.A. ]951: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ]1~ U.S. 356 [6 RCt.
1064. 30 L.Ed. 2201: Hoyt Bros. Inc. v. Grafld Rapids, 260
Mich. 447 r245 N.W. 5091.)
The provisions of the Municipal Code which have been
8UIJlmarized in ~onnection with the discus..o;ion concerning their
application to the ~harita bJe work of a religious organization
effectively hamper and restrict any endeavor to better the
lot of tho~e in need of material aid and comfort if that effort
dOeR not conform to an undiRclosed !It.andard. The work of
every organizat.ion mum meet the approval of the department: Rllch as do not. are unfit t.o live. Moreover. in it.s practical aspects the ordinance is particularly burdensome upon
organizations sllch 8S the Gospel Army. which continually
solicits donations. "Every person soliciting any contribution
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for any ch!lritahle purposr must. file with the Department
wit.hin ~o nays after the elosr of any '111ch solil'itation or
witl1in 30 oa:v~ llfter a 00mnnn therefor b:v thE' Department
a rrnort to t.hE'.)1epartnfrnt 'ltatin~ thE' contri1mtjon~ scrnred
from or a~ a result of an~' o;11l'h 'lolil'it~tion. ann in nrt-ail
all !'xpensE'S of or connectE'n \\-ith 'l11(·h '101il'itntion. ann '1howin,., exaetl:v for what \l"~<: ann in'wllRt mrnner :Ill snch contrihution~ were or are to be nishurs(>n or Cljstribnteo."
(§ 44.14. ) What constitute!" "the "losl' of any such solicitation'" And to what extent mmrt thl' organi:r.ation '1how
"exactlv for what use~ ant'! in what manner all !Inch contributi~ns were or are to be oisbut'!led or distrihuted~" Is
every person who is a beneficiar:v of thl' org'ani:r.ation'~ helpfulness to be named? Is the valuE' of th!lt aid to be !It.aled
in terms of money or !lPiritual comfort.? MU!lt a suh!>t.antial
part of the effort intended for hllman hetterment h(> devoted
to making reports to a ~overnmental agency !let upon the
minute and continuing supervision of all I"haritab1e act.ivitie!l?
Very obviously, the purpose of these reports is to provide
a basis for keeping each organi:r.ation within the range of a
policy which is not stated in the ordinance and may be as
variable as differin/! views upon permi!l!lible bound!l of !locial
service. For an information card may be recalled by the
board upon receipt of data which. in its opinion. !lhall render
incorrect any matement set forth in t.hat nocument. Under
such circumstances. the board shall amend or correct the
card. or issue 8 new one in accordance with the additional
datil obtained. But impliedl~' each card is to be i!'l..'1ued for
a period which need not be uniform as to all applicant.'l.
and is valid only during that time (§ 44.02). Under those
provisions, only by carrying' on it.'l work in accordance with
the views of the Board of Social Service Commissioners, and
making reports in !lUch detail as to satisfy demands which
cannot be mea!IUred against any standards set by law, may
an or/!anization continue.
Also. there is no standard or limitation provided in regard
to the data printed npon the information card. As a solicitor
must show this card to each prospective donor, allowin/! him
sufficient opportunity to read it before acceptin~ any contribution the board may arbitrarily express disapproval of
a worthy charity or make the information so voluminous that
solicitation would be effectively blocked. And the unlimited
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power given to the board to publish the result.s of its inyestigations is broad enough to authorize presentation to
t.he public of confidential data concerning policies and details of managrmrnt haying..no relation to reasonable licensing
requirements ;>
If an organization rUlls t.he WlUntlet of these prc)\"isions
and is ahle to curry on its work .to the sutisfurtion of the
official censors of charitahle pnrpose]>, every person whom it
employs for "pecuniary compensation or ('onsirleration ,. to
obtain subscriptions from the pub1ir must also secure a lirl'nse.
The way of an applicant for such a license is 1\ hard one. In
his application he must set forth. in addition to facts show.
ing that he "is of good character and reputat.ion, ,. "snrh
information as may be required by the board." Thereupon.
thE' board shall make such investigation of the applicant and
his affairs as it deems adyisable. No Iimitat.ion as to the
extent of such an investir.ation is imposed and no time is
fixed within which it must be concluded. Any ground that
w(\uld have led to a denial of the license ill also ground for
its revocation.
If. contrary to the narrow interpretation of religion laid
down by my associates, human kindness is included in its
practice, then these provisions governing the licensing of
individuals to solicit contributions are clearly invalid. for
they go much further than to lay down a reasonable requirement for registration and identification. Indeed, there is
no statutory statement of the data which an applicant must
submit, for the specified information is "in addition" to
that which may be required by the board. The majority
allows the regulation of solicitation for religious purposes
to go far beyond the limitation specified by the United States
Supreme Court in the Cantwell case. supra, by approving
the requirements that a promoter or solicitor be granted
a license only if the board is satisfied that he is of good
character and reputation and equal to the financial responsihility incident to the proposed solicitation; that he file a
bond and pay a license fee; and that he give II complicated
form of receipt to each contributor. The provision authorizing the revocation of II license after II hearing, for any "unfair, unjust, inequitable or fraudulent" act or for any ground
that would have led to a denial of t.he liCl'nst:' also goc!'I far
beyond the permissible bounds fixed fo1' re~ulatioll of solicita,tion for a religious purpose.
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And construing any organized plan for taking care of
those in need of material aid as beyond the reach of religiou"
duty or concern, the licensing provisions which have been
mentioned in. the next to the last paragraph unreasonably
restrict the right of an indivic1'u?1 to engage in the business
of solicitation for charitable purposes and also fail to set
up a definite standard l"hich the applicant for a license must
meet. The cases cited by the majority as authority for the
proposition that a promoter or solicitor may be required to
submit proof of his good character and reputation stand only
for the rule that a state may do so in connection with regulation of t.he practice of a profession which requires the possession of special knowledge, skill and training, or the sale of
merchandise of a particular character. (Leach v. Daugherty,
73 Cal.App. 83 [238 P. 160] [broker's certificate under the
Corporate Securities Act); Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589
[185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418} [license of real estate broker];
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 [20 S.Ot. 633, 44 L.Ed.
725] [license for sale of cigarettes].) These decisions, in
my judgment, have no application to legislation laying down
licensing requirements for the business of soliciting funds for
charitable purposes.
A recent controversy in Michigan presented substantially
the same question as is no'v before this court. An ordinance
which prohibited the solicitation of contributions or the sale
of goods "the proceeds from which, or any part thereof, are
to be used for any so-called charitable purpose" without
a written permit to be granted by the city manager, when it
appeared, after investigation ana report by a police officer,
"that the charity is a worth~' one" and that the applicants
for a permit "are fit and responsible parties," was held to
violate the provisions of a state constitution prohibiting deprivation of life, liberty. or property without due process
of law. "It is requisite to the validity of the ordinance,"
said the court, "t.hat it should state 'a standard for the
guidance' of the official who passes upon the application for
the permit. . . • The general and indefinite teMrul used in
this ordinance wholly fail to comply with this requisite."
(Hoyt Bms. Inc. v. Grand Rapids, supra, [128 A.L.R. 1363).)
Turning to the other provision of the Los Angeles Munic·
ipal Code which is in controversy, although, generally speaking, the business activities of a religious organization come
within the scope of regulations tending to protect the morals,
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---------------------------------------safety or general wclfal'l: of the public, section 24.01 relating
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to dealers· in secondhand goods"'is also unconstitutional for
the reason that it sets no standard to which an applicant for
a license must conform. To carry on th~ business of a "sec·
ondhand dealer," one must "file an app'Ucation in writing
with the Board [Qi Police Commissioners] specifying by street
and number the place where such proposed business is proposed to be conducted or carried on; . . . The application
shall be signed by the applicant and shall contain his residence address. Upon receipt of such application the board
shall cause to be investigated the business of the applicant and
location at which applicant proposes to engage in business as
specified in said application. Thereafter the board may issue
a permit to the applicant which shall be effective for the remaining portion of the current year."
This enactment states no grounds justifying a denial of
the application, specifies no time within which an investigation must be made, makes no provision for a hearing upon
the application, and by the use of the word "may," impliedly allows the board to grant or withhold official favor
for any reason which whim or fancy may dictate. No standard
of character or business responsibility is set for the guidance
of the board nor are there any qualifications specified for one
desiring to deal in secondhand goods. Such legislation has
uniformly been held not to measure up to the requirements
of constitutional guarantees. (In re Dart, supra; Hewitt v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, supra; Schaezlein v. Cabaniss. supra; County of Los Angeles v. Hollywood Cemetery
Assn., supra; Ex parte Sing Lee, supra: Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
supra; Hoyt Bros. Inc. v. Grand Rapids, supra.
Under these circumstanceS, in my opinion, as the right of
the Gospel Army and those acting in its behalf to solicit
contributions for either religious or charitable purposes is a
property right, the unlawful interference with which will
cause irreparable injury, the trial court properly enjoined
the enforcement of the ordinances here challenged (Brock
v. Superior Court, 12 Ca1.2d 605 [86 P.2d 805]; Bueneman v.
Oity of Santa Barbara, 8 Ca1.2d 405 [65 P.2d 884, 109 A.L.R.
895] ), and the judgment should ·be affirmed.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 17, 1945. Edmonds, J., Carter J., and Schauer, J., voted
for a rehearing.

